Foreign Divestment in E-business: Analysis of foreign market exit of Groupon and Lyyti by Vollner, Daniela
 











FOREIGN DIVESTMENT IN E-BUSINESS 
 
















D.Sc., Ph.D. Kari Liuhto 












































The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of 
Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin Originality Check service.  
Table of contents 
1	 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 6	
1.1	 Foreign divestments in e-business ................................................................. 6	
1.2	 Earlier empirical studies on factors leading to foreign divestments .............. 9	
1.3	 Objective and structure of the research ........................................................ 18	
1.4	 Definition of key concepts ........................................................................... 19	
2	 THEORIES ON FOREIGN DIVESTMENTS ...................................................... 23	
2.1	 An overview of theories on foreign divestment decisions ........................... 23	
2.2	 Divestment model by Benito ....................................................................... 30	
2.2.1	 Environmental stability .................................................................... 33	
2.2.2	 Attractiveness of current operations ................................................ 34	
2.2.3	 Strategic fit ....................................................................................... 35	
2.2.4	 Governance issues ........................................................................... 35	
3	 RESEARCH DESIGN .......................................................................................... 38	
3.1	 Research approach ....................................................................................... 38	
3.2	 Data collection ............................................................................................. 39	
3.3	 Data analysis ................................................................................................ 44	
3.4	 Evaluation of the study ................................................................................ 45	
4	 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ...................................................................................... 48	
4.1	 Case Lyyti .................................................................................................... 48	
4.1.1	 Background ...................................................................................... 48	
4.1.2	 Empirical findings ........................................................................... 51	
4.2	 Case Groupon ............................................................................................... 56	
4.2.1	 Background ...................................................................................... 56	
4.2.2	 Empirical findings ........................................................................... 58	
4.3	 A summary of the main empirical findings ................................................. 61	
5	 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 65	
5.1	 Theoretical contributions ............................................................................. 65	
5.2	 Managerial implications ............................................................................... 68	
5.3	 Suggestions for further research .................................................................. 69	
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 70	
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 77	
Appendix 1: Earlier empirical studies on factors leading to foreign divestments . 77	
Appendix 2: Interview themes ............................................................................... 81	
 
  
List of figures 
Figure 1	 Internet world penetration rates by geographic regions in November 
2015..... .................................................................................................. 6	
Figure 2	 E-sales and e-purchases made by enterprises in the EU-28, % of 
turnover on e-sales of the total turnover of enterprises in the EU-28 
(2008 to 2014) ....................................................................................... 7	
Figure 3	 Timeline of the main findings regarding foreign divestment    
decisions .............................................................................................. 16	
Figure 4	 Structure of the thesis .......................................................................... 19	
Figure 5	 Categorizing e-business according to type of application ................... 20	
Figure 6	 Key foreign divestment factors ........................................................... 23	
Figure 7	 Reactive vs. proactive divestment model ............................................ 25	
Figure 8	 Dominant causes leading to international divestments ....................... 27	
Figure 9	 Conceptual model explaining the exit from a foreign market ............. 29	
Figure 10	 The decision to stay or to exit ............................................................. 31	
Figure 11	 Divestment of foreign operations: A framework ................................ 32	
Figure 12	 Stock value development of Groupon Inc (NASDAQ:GRPN) ........... 59	
Figure 13	 Benito’s framework on divestment of foreign operations (1997b) 
complemented with the empirical findings of this research ................ 62	
 
 
List of tables 
Table 1	 Operationalization chart ...................................................................... 42	
Table 2 	 Categorization matrix .......................................................................... 45	




1.1 Foreign divestments in e-business 
The Internet has brought profound changes to the way companies conduct business today. 
Many industries have transformed completely over the years and the rules for business 
have been rewritten. The rapidly changing market is causing new challenges for 
companies. Competition is increasingly intense, the market is globalizing, customers are 
demanding more, technologies are advancing at a dramatic pace and becoming 
increasingly affordable, and the Internet is getting rapidly diffused globally. (Xu & 
Quaddus 2009.) According to Internet World Stats (2015), the highest Internet 
penetration rate is in North America with nearly 90 per cent while the world average 
penetration rate was reported to be close to 50 per cent in November 2015 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Internet world penetration rates by geographic regions in November 2015 
 
Source: Internet World Stats (2015). 
In line with the ongoing digital revolution, e-business is becoming more popular and 
expanding dramatically. Companies are increasingly using the Internet to buy and sell 
goods and services, service customers, collaborate with business partners, and conduct 
transactions within an organization. According to Eurostat (2015), e-commerce has been 
growing relatively steadily over the last decade. In 2014, 40 per cent of enterprises in the 



















enterprises in the same period. The turnover for electronic sales was 17 per cent of the 
total turnover of enterprises with 10 or more employees (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 E-sales and e-purchases made by enterprises in the EU-28, % of turnover 
on e-sales of the total turnover of enterprises in the EU-28 (2008 to 2014) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2015). 
In recent years increased digitalization has led to a rapid growth in the number of e-
business companies that are completely reliant on the Internet and its services. Through 
the internationalization process of these companies there has been an increase in the 
availability of new and foreign markets. (Dung Le & Rothlauf 2008.) Hart (2010) sees 
that the existence of a new technological infrastructure has reduced or even erased barriers 
to entry in foreign markets. A new kind of economy has emerged, where e-business 
companies and global companies specialized in Internet services play a central role 
(Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson 2010). 
Firms are expanding to international markets at an ever increasing pace (Sousa & Tan 
2015). Simultaneously, an increase in market entries is often accompanied by a higher 
number of market withdrawals in a subsequent period (Dunne et al. 1988). 
Internationalizing the business scope is not simple, which is why many multinational 
companies incur most of their losses abroad (Jagersma & van Gorp 2003). International 
expansion exposes firms to an array of challenges, especially regarding entries in 
culturally distant countries (Li 1995; Barkema et al. 1996). 
Wenzel (2015), co-founder and CEO of the food delivery company Foodpanda, spoke 
at a hub conference in Berlin about unexpected problems when internationalizing an e-
business model. In the beginning Wenzel expected internationalization to be relatively 
easy for an e-business company, since the Internet is everywhere and people are 
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everywhere. He thought that if a business model works in one country, it should easily 
work in another country and therefore e-business models can be exported. Wenzel 
describes the internationalization process as first building a website and putting the 
offering on the website. After this the company starts with online marketing activities in 
the host country to see how the website works. As with many e-business companies, 
Foodpanda’s business was centralized and all foreign markets were managed from one 
country. A few years after Foodpanda had begun its internationalization, Wenzel noticed 
that the reality was very different from what he had expected. Foreign markets turned out 
to be a lot more complex and the business model as well as marketing activities did not 
work even nearly the same way as in the home country. 
In December 2015, the online magazine Gründerszene reported that Foodpanda had 
sold its operations in Vietnam to a local rival (Schlenk 2015). Only a couple of months 
later the operations were sold in Brazil and Mexico as well. At the same time rumors went 
around that the business in India was also for sale. The reason was announced to be the 
strategy of the parent company. Business units that did not belong to the core business 
and did not achieve market leadership were divested. The business in Brazil and Mexico 
had counted in the last year for less than five per cent of Foodpanda’s turnover. Wenzel 
stated that divesting operations in South America would enable the company to focus on 
its key markets in Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. (Wirminghaus 2015b.) 
Wenzel is not alone with his experience but there have been in fact many similar cases 
in the e-business industry. In the last few years a growing number of e-business 
companies has reported to retreat from foreign markets. In March 2015, Lendico decided 
to partly withdraw its operations from Africa, Poland, South Africa, and Spain. 
Steinkühler, CEO of the online marketplace for peer-to-peer loans, commented that the 
development in these countries had remained below expectations. The offices in 
Johannesburg and Madrid were closed down and private investors were not allowed to 
finance loans anymore. However, Lendico continued to provide credits in the divested 
countries while managing the business centralized from Berlin. (Wirminghaus 2015a.) 
Bonativo, a delivery company for local food, followed Lendico’s example by 
withdrawing from London in September 2015. Only a few months after the online 
company had started its operations in London the market exit was announced. On the 
website there was a message saying that Bonativo had started operations within a short 
period of time in three countries, and building the service in three markets was a greater 
challenge than first expected. CEO Eggert explained that the business model is complex 
and not easy to implement. Furthermore, Eggert continued that Germany was a more 
attractive market for the company’s expansion ambitions. (Loeffler 2015a.) 
Around the same time as Bonativo, the Belgian restaurant delivery service Take Eat 
Easy suddenly changed its strategy and announced its exit from the German market, only 
a few weeks after entering there. CEO of Take Eat Easy Germany reported in a newsletter 
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that the company had decided to divest its operations in Germany due to strategic 
considerations. The decision was unexpected and the start-up was reluctant to reveal any 
further explanations. (Loeffler 2015b.) 
Continuing the trend of foreign divestments, the successful online cleaning agency 
Helpling announced its exit from four countries. The ambitious start-up had launched 
within 18 months in 14 countries and employed hundreds of employees. By the end of 
September 2015, 20 per cent of the employees had been laid off. According to Franke, 
founder of the company, this was a natural step after a phase of fast growth. Helpling 
wanted to focus on the most profitable markets in order to make the business sustainably 
profitable and to use its resources as efficiently as possible. (Loeffler 2015c.) 
One month later the online travel agency TravelBird followed by cutting 100 
workplaces and announcing its withdrawal from five countries. Since the beginning of 
2014, the Dutch start-up had rapidly expanded into 17 countries and was employing more 
than 700 employees. Then came the step backwards. CEO Jansma reported that the 
contracts in Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain would not be continued and the 
business activities would be critically evaluated. Moreover, it was emphasized that 
TravelBird was not having problems but the divestment decision was due to 
underperformance of operations in the given countries. (Kyriasoglou 2015.) 
The meaning of withdrawing from a foreign market has expanded from closing down 
a whole factory or a brick and mortar shop in another country to divesting international 
operations on the web. E-business companies may not even have physical entities in a 
foreign country but are able to control their business activities centralized from one 
location. Based on the notable change in the internationalization behavior of e-business 
companies, it is clear that they differ from traditional companies in many aspects. 
Therefore, it will be interesting to examine the factors leading to their foreign divestments 
and find out if this is another area where e-business companies prove their difference. 
1.2 Earlier empirical studies on factors leading to foreign 
divestments 
In order to give an understanding of the existing knowledge on foreign divestments, this 
chapter will discuss the methodology and key findings of earlier empirical studies made 
on the topic. Since the first researchers started showing interest towards foreign 
divestments in the 1970s, the number of studies made around the topic has increased 
significantly. However, no prior research has been done to examine the factors leading to 
foreign divestments in the e-business sector specifically. Therefore, the focus of this 
literature review has been extended to empirical studies on factors leading to foreign 
divestments, regardless the industry. Studies on divestments in general, the consequences 
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of divestments, or the divestment process, are not included. Moreover, studies discussing 
solely domestic divestments will not be presented here either. 
Boddewyn and Torneden (1974) were pioneers in foreign divestment research when 
they began studying 53 U.S. multinational companies (MNCs) with divested international 
operations. What they discovered was that foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions are 
initially made top-down, which hinders the evaluation of the quality of the decision. 
Furthermore, in many cases companies were found to lack a clear international strategy 
and their foreign operations did not have clear operational definitions. The results also 
indicated that the parent companies had poor external relations with the host country, and 
that divestments often happened after a significant organizational change. 
Torneden (1975) continued studying divestments in U.S. MNCs with the objective to 
identify factors behind the divestment decision and how the decision is made. The 
research method was an intensive case study including eight case studies as well as 
responses by 38 companies to a survey. Based on the collected data, Torneden reported 
the following seven key determinants for market exit: (1) a change in senior management 
within the prior two years; (2) poor performance of domestic operations; (3) a 
disproportionate amount of management time spent on the foreign operation relative to 
its size and profit; (4) political change in the host country; (5) political uncertainty 
generated by another host government in the region; (6) weak top management 
commitment to international markets; and (7) increased capital requirements within the 
foreign unit. The ultimate conclusion was that new senior management and a lack of 
commitment of the senior executive have the most significant impact on foreign 
divestments. 
Boddewyn also followed with more material on international divestments and 
published in 1976 together with Business International an article based on a survey of 32 
international companies with a total of 69 divestments. The results suggested that 
companies consider divestment decisions as failures, triggered by the following key 
factors: (1) poor performance and prospects; (2) adverse environmental conditions; (3) 
bad acquisitions; (4) lack of strategic fit; (5) lack of managerial fit; (6) lack of resources; 
(7) problems elsewhere in the company; and/or (8) bad management. Given the 
dominance of profitability considerations in the study, strategic thinking was argued to 
be secondary when it comes to explaining exit decisions. However, Boddewyn and 
Business International noticed some differences between companies in the U.S. and in 
Europe. While U.S. companies tended to divest for both strategic reasons, i.e. the foreign 
unit no longer fits the business, and tactical reasons, i.e. poor performance, European 
firms were found to divest solely on tactical grounds. 
In the same year Sachdev (1976) studied 21 cases of foreign divestments by British 
multinational companies, finding support that financial considerations are the strongest 
factor responsible for divestments. Sachdev further specified that low profitability was 
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found to have the highest impact, followed by commercial difficulties and restrictions on 
fund transfers. Risks and uncertainties in the host country were also perceived to play a 
role in the divestment decision. 
Li (1995) began studying foreign divestments from another point of view, 
investigating entry modes of foreign subsidiaries in the U.S. computer and 
pharmaceutical industries over the 1974–1989 period. The results demonstrated that exit 
rates were higher for foreign acquisitions and joint ventures than for subsidiaries that were 
established through greenfield investments. Furthermore, Li noted that diversified 
subsidiaries were more likely to be divested than those that stayed related to the 
headquarters. Finally, firms were found to benefit from international learning and 
experience, which improved the chances of success for subsequent foreign operations.  
The latter point was also discussed in the study of Barkema et al. (1996) one year later. 
Their article examined the longevity of foreign entries by using data on 225 entries of 13 
Dutch firms from 1966 onwards. The results showed that firms entering foreign countries 
face cultural adjustment costs which may influence the survival of a foreign unit. The 
longevity was found to decrease in cases of double layered acculturation, such as joint 
ventures or acquisitions. However, Barkema et al. noted that internationalizing firms 
could move along a learning curve and benefit from prior experience in the same country 
and in other countries in the same cultural block. 
Godar (1997) was interested in finding out if the drivers for foreign divestment were 
simply reverse of those for foreign investment. Moreover, she examined if firms divest 
when they have the opportunity to purchase outside of the company, and if the exit 
barriers of Caves and Porter (1976) hold true in foreign divestment situations. Godar 
developed a model which she tested by conducting a survey on U.S. firms from various 
industries, including manufacturing, service, and extractive companies that had made a 
voluntary divestiture of a non-U.S. operation. Her findings indicated that the key driver 
for divestments is a firm’s strategy, not environmental factors. Approximately one third 
of the divestments were made proactively, i.e. when the operation was performing well, 
but the firm found better ways to reallocate its resources. Finally, it appeared that the exit 
barriers of Caves and Porter (1976), such as longevity, interconnections, and divestment 
cost, are not operational in foreign divestments. 
Benito (1997a), another devoted researcher in the divestment field, studied the 
divestments of 93 Norwegian companies from 1982 to 1992 by using a sample of 208 
FDIs. Within the eleven-year period of his study, Benito found that more than half of the 
foreign subsidiaries had been divested. The results implied that foreign divestment is 
inversely related to the host country’s economic growth. Moreover, Benito claimed that 
subsidiaries that had been acquired were more likely to be divested than greenfield 
establishments. This supported the results from the study of Barkema et al. (1996), in 
which acquired subsidiaries were found to last less time on the market. Finally, in 
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accordance with Li’s (1995) findings, the risk of divestment was argued to be higher for 
unrelated than related subsidiaries. 
Four years after Barkema et al. (1996) another study on the longevity of foreign 
entrants was published. Mata and Portugal (2000) obtained the data of their study from a 
survey conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. The survey had been 
conducted every year since 1982, which allowed a longitudinal research. Mata and 
Portugal found that greenfield entries are less likely to be divested than firms with limited 
liability. In addition, the results indicated that ownership arrangements as well as 
organizational structure affect the risk of divestment, and that firms with large human 
capital are less likely to exit. 
Shin (2000) followed Benito’s (1997a) path in examining the factors affecting foreign 
divestment but focused specifically on the trading sector. The study used data from the 
Korean Ministry of Finance and an analysis of 378 companies that had invested in or 
divested from South Korea from 1993 onwards. According to the results, the size of a 
foreign affiliate is negatively related to foreign divestment in the Korean trading sector. 
However, Shin did not find evidence for his other two hypotheses, that operating years or 
ownership ratios would play a role in divestment decisions. 
The increasing level of retail divestment activity led Alexander and Quinn (2002) to 
examine two prominent cases of international market withdrawal in the retailing industry. 
Based on the results, the following main reasons for divestment could be identified: (1) 
trading conditions in the domestic market; (2) changes in top management; (3) lack of 
integration between home and host country operations; (4) lack of managerial 
commitment; (5) independence of international operations; (6) relative size of 
international operations; and (7) disproportionate resource allocation to international 
operations. Furthermore, Alexander and Quinn noted that international market divestment 
is often a proactively made strategic decision when the company identifies better use for 
its resources and decides to reallocate them. Alexander and Quinn concluded that early 
experiences of internationalization help the firm shape further, later international moves. 
The findings implied that prior market failures led the case companies change their 
strategy fundamentally in subsequent market entries. 
Jagersma and van Gorp (2003) made an extensive field study to analyze the motives 
behind Dutch multinational companies’ international divestments and the following 
consequences. The empirical data used in the study was from a total of 868 international 
divestments on the period 1981 through 2000. Absence of strategic policy synergy as well 
as poor performance of the international operation were found to be the dominant causes 
for international divestment. Other, less significant motives included alternative local or 
global growth opportunities, follow the market leader behavior, unfavorable political 
climate, lack of competitive edge, and conflicting policy views. 
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Leung et al. (2008) began the research on divestments in the service sector by 
explaining entry and exit decisions of foreign banks in Hong Kong through a theoretical 
framework. Data was collected from the period of 1981 to 2001, using a sample of 157 
banks from 35 different countries. The results suggested that non-Asian banks with less 
international experience, and whose home country is experiencing slower trade growth 
with Hong Kong, will be more likely to exit the market. Furthermore, divestments were 
also found to be linked to the slow growth of the Hong Kong banking sector. 
Cairns et al. (2010) were the first to specify their focus on the role of leadership in 
divestment decisions. The research method used in this study was a multiple case 
approach where the cases were selected from a database of international retail divestment 
activity over the period of 1987 to 2008. The findings implied that all of the divestment 
cases could be classified as a result of a corporate crisis or as a proactive action, i.e. 
positive restructuring. Cairns et al. described corporate crisis as an instance when the 
management fails to deliver stability and strategic focus, and where international 
divestment is driven by the need to refocus on core operations in the home market. Thus, 
instability in leadership structures was argued to have severe consequences for the 
company’s international operations. Interestingly, Cairns et al. pointed out that companies 
tend to appoint a new CEO to trigger the divestment decision and to act as a change agent 
during the corporate restructuring phase. In addition to being a response to failure, Cairns 
et al. argued that divestment may also be a strategic decision. Positive restructuring was 
described as an instance where companies respond proactively to changing market 
conditions and emerging opportunities. As noted already before (see e.g. Alexander & 
Quinn 2002), companies may decide to divest in order to devote their resources more 
efficiently elsewhere. 
Continuing the research on foreign bank exits, Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2010) 
studied 81 closed foreign bank subsidiaries across 37 countries during 1999–2006. Based 
on the results, Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski argued that a multinational bank’s decision 
to divest a foreign unit is caused by problems in the home country rather than the 
underperformance of the subsidiary. 
In the following year, Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2011) published another study 
on the same topic, using panel data for 149 closed or divested foreign bank subsidiaries 
across 54 countries from the period of 1997 to 2009. The findings further supported the 
conclusion of their previous study, that foreign subsidiaries are mainly closed because of 
problems in the home country. Moreover, weak financial performance of the parent 
company was found to increase the risk of foreign divestment. Hryckiewicz and 
Kowalewski concluded that the likelihood of divestment was highest when the 
profitability of the parent bank and its foreign affiliate decrease at the same time. 
Still remaining in the banking industry, the study of Jackowicz and Kowalewski (2011) 
focused on the role of external factors on divestments. The empirical results from 313 
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divestment transactions between 1997 and 2010 suggested that parent companies of 
divested units often originate from countries with relatively high accumulated wealth, 
slow GDP growth, stable macroeconomic situation, and dominant bank intermediation in 
the financial system. 
Ketkar and Ali Saleem (2012) looked at divestments from another point of view and 
investigated how a firm’s home country institutional quality influences the quality of its 
international divestment decisions. In addition, the study examined the effects of these 
factors on developed and developing host countries during normal and crises years. 
Ketkar and Ali Saleem used a sample of 85 divestments in 42 countries from the period 
of 2000 to 2008. The results of their empirical data showed that the home country’s 
institutional quality explains divestments from developed countries, but not from 
emerging markets. 
Berry (2013) studied the moderating effect of product and market characteristics on 
divestment decisions. The study was based on the analysis of the divestment decisions of 
a comprehensive panel of U.S. MNCs across their international operations from 1989 to 
2004. The results supported the negative relationship of poor performance and 
divestments in both related and unrelated firm operations in locations characterized by 
low growth, policy stability, and exchange rate stability. However, in countries 
characterized by high growth, policy instability, and exchange rate volatility, there 
seemed to be significant differences across the divestment decisions of companies for 
their related and unrelated foreign units. Furthermore, Berry noted that only about one 
third of the divested foreign units were poorly performing. 
One year later, Nyuur and Debrah (2014) expanded the divestment research field to 
developing countries by using Ghana as a case example. Nyuur and Debrah studied 
factors influencing foreign firms’ strategic decisions in a host country, regarding 
expansion, downsizing, relocation and termination of their operations. The empirical data 
was collected through a questionnaire survey of 92 foreign companies operating in Ghana 
between 2009 and 2010. The findings implied that host countries’ business environments 
have a significant impact on foreign firms’ subsequent strategic decisions. Furthermore, 
unfavorable conditions regarding government regulations, cost factors, and infrastructure 
were found to increase the probability of strategic divestment. 
In the same year Pattnaik and Lee (2014) published a study examining how cross-
national distance influences the divestment of foreign operations. The data was gathered 
from 1697 multinational corporations headquartered in Korea and their 2435 affiliates in 
67 host countries between 2000 and 2010. Pattnaik and Lee reported that distance created 
by economic, financial, political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and 
global connectedness increases the likelihood of international divestment. Moreover, the 
impact of cross-national distance on foreign divestments was claimed to become stronger 
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when a MNC enters a foreign market through a joint venture and weaker for affiliates 
with higher international experience in the host country. 
Song (2014a) investigated the conditions leading to foreign manufacturing subsidiary 
survival in labor-intensive industries when the labor costs in the host country are rising. 
The study utilized a sample of 1560 foreign subsidiaries of 101 Korean MNCs in 31 host 
countries. The companies were all publicly listed on the Korean stock exchange from 
1990 to 2008. Song identified that underperforming, smaller, and stand-alone units, 
especially in riskier countries, have a higher risk of being divested. Moreover, the 
likelihood of divestment was found to further increase for foreign affiliates that are facing 
currency appreciation and increasing labor costs. 
In the same year, Song (2014b) published another study where he was examining how 
different entry modes and environmental uncertainty in host countries can influence the 
exit of multinational companies’ foreign subsidiaries. The study used a large sample of 
FDIs by Korean manufacturing MNCs from 1990 to 2007. Song noted that partially-
owned subsidiaries are more likely to exit the market than fully-owned ones that have 
greater irreversibility. Moreover, environmental uncertainty was found to strengthen the 
impact of irreversible entry modes on the likelihood of a subsidiary exit. 
Soule et al. (2014) investigated the diffusion of foreign divestments by MNCs from 
Burma. 449 firms from 32 countries were utilized as a sample, all of which had business 
ties to Burma in the period of 1996 to 2002. The results indicated that firms divest in 
response to the political conditions of their home country, pressures by their different 
stakeholders, and actions of members in their relevant reference groups. 
Finally, Sousa and Tan (2015) published a study that focused specifically on the effects 
of strategic fit and international performance on a company’s decision to exit a foreign 
market. Furthermore, the moderating impact of cultural distance and international 
experience was also considered in the research. The empirical data was collected through 
a questionnaire survey from 180 outward foreign investment firms. Subsequently, it was 
analyzed through a framework created by the authors. The study showed that strategic 
misfit and poor international performance have a detrimental impact on the firm’s 
survival in the foreign market. In addition, the results indicated that cultural distance 
strengthens the negative impact of internal strategic fit on the exit decision. However, the 
findings implied that the larger the cultural distance between home and host market, the 
less likely managers are to divest poorly performing foreign activities. To conclude, the 
study showed that as international experience increases, managers are more willing to 
withdraw a poorly performing foreign affiliate from a culturally distant market. 
Figure 3 provides an overview on the findings of the aforementioned studies. The 
timeline summarizes the most important results regarding foreign divestment decisions. 
In order to avoid duplication in the timeline, only new findings are presented even though 
other researchers may have come to the same results later on.  
16 
Figure 3 Timeline of the main findings regarding foreign divestment decisions 
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As presented in the timeline, earlier empirical research examining the factors leading 
to foreign divestments has shown that there are various reasons why firms may decide to 
exit a foreign market. The most common explanations are financial considerations and a 
lack of strategic fit between the headquarters and its foreign affiliate. Furthermore, the 
studies point out the influence of cultural distance and business environment on 
international divestments. In addition, the chosen entry mode is noted to play a role in the 
survival of the foreign affiliate. Foreign acquisitions are reported to have a higher risk of 
divestment than greenfield investments. Another observation made in several cases is that 
international experience has a moderating impact on exit decisions. Other less frequent 
factors that were identified were, inter alia, lack of strategy, poor relations with the host 
country, organizational changes, change of management, lack of managerial 
commitment, size of the foreign affiliate, as well as problems in the home country. 
Despite the slowly growing number of studies on foreign divestment decisions, it 
remains a neglected area in the international business and strategy field worldwide 
(McDermott 2010). A possible explanation for this may be the difficulty in obtaining 
appropriate data. Studies of exit often require longitudinal research, and what is more, 
companies tend to associate divestment with failure and are thus unwilling to talk about 
it. (Benito 1997a.) Nevertheless, Benito emphasizes that firms need knowledge about 
which factors influence the longevity and success of foreign operations in order to assess 
potential FDI projects.  Knowledge about the motives for divestment can provide useful 
information about adequate policy measures and appropriate government actions. Prior 
research has shown that learning from failure tends to be more effective than learning 
from success (Madsen & Desai 2010). Research on exit behavior is important for 
managers as it can inform them about factors that inhibit success. This, in turn, may 
improve the probability of future success. (Sousa & Tan 2015.) 
As seen in this literature review, the majority of earlier divestment studies have been 
quantitative studies. Most of these studies have focused on examining the impact of one 
or two specific factors on divestment decisions instead of trying to create a comprehensive 
picture of the different motives underlying a divestment decision. In order to get a deeper 
understanding about the factors leading to foreign divestments, more qualitative research 
is needed. 
Moreover, until today there have been no earlier empirical studies on market exits in 
the e-business sector. Prior research in this field has widely focused on explaining the 
internationalization and market entry of e-business companies (e.g. Loane et al. 2004; 
Drakulevski & Mijoska 2008; Ziyae et al. 2014). As McDermott (2010) points out, the 
change in international business has been accompanied by a similarly notable change in 
foreign divestment activities. It is evident that there is a research gap in examining the 
factors leading e-business companies to exit from foreign markets. 
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1.3 Objective and structure of the research 
The objective of this study is to understand why e-business companies decide to divest 
from foreign markets. The main purpose is to examine what is the role of different factors 
on foreign divestment decisions in the e-business sector. Consequently, the research 
question is formulated as follows: 
 
What are the factors leading to foreign divestment in e-business? 
 
Benito’s (1997b) model of divestment determinants is used as the theoretical 
framework for this research. Following his model, the research question is divided into 
four sub-questions, i.e. what is the role of the following factors on foreign divestment in 
e-business: 
 
1. Environmental stability 
2. Attractiveness of current operations 
3. Strategic fit 
4. Governance issues 
 
The empirical evidence will be presented in form of a case study. As Benito (1997b, 
329) states in the conclusions of his article, “empirical research is needed to assess the 
validity of the various propositions embedded in the framework”. The aim of this research 
is to examine whether Benito’s framework is valid in the e-business sector as well as find 
out what is the importance of the various factors of his model. 
Divestments are often associated with multiple issues around the phenomenon. These 
are for example the divestment process, consequences of foreign divestments, and the 
moderating effect of different factors on the decision to withdraw from a market. 
Furthermore, many earlier studies have examined market exits by using data from 
domestic divestments. However, the aim of this study is to focus solely on foreign 
divestments and the factors that lead to the decision to withdraw from a foreign market. 
Other aspects concerning divestments as well as domestic divestments are left out of the 
scope of this thesis. The structure of this thesis is presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Structure of the thesis 
 
 
After providing an introduction to the research objectives in the first chapter, the next 
section will continue with presenting the theoretical framework. In the third chapter the 
research design will be described, i.e. the research approach, method of data collection, 
method of data analysis, as well as trustworthiness and limitations of the research. The 
fourth chapter follows with a description of the chosen case companies and the findings 
of the empirical data. To conclude, the last section discusses the theoretical contributions 
of the study, managerial implications, as well as suggestions for further research. 
1.4 Definition of key concepts 
In this thesis there are two important key concepts that need further introduction. First, 
this chapter will discuss the term e-business, after which the concept of foreign 
divestment will be presented in more detail. 
Electronic business (e-business): The definitions of electronic business (often 
abbreviated as e-business) are many and diverse. The term ‘e-business’ is frequently used 
interchangeably with the term ‘e-commerce’ (Mazzarol 2015). There is an ongoing debate 
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on the similarities and differences of these two terms, which may be explained due to the 
lack of well-established literature. Furthermore, in their relatively short history the terms 
have generated a variety of different meanings for different people. (Xu & Quaddus 
2009.) 
While Albaum et al. (2005) define electronic commerce as the sale, purchase, or 
exchange of goods, services, or information over the Internet, Holsapple and Singh (2000) 
consider electronic business as a broader concept that encompasses the buying and selling 
activities of electronic commerce. After examining multiple definitions of e-business in 
previous literature they advanced the following definition: 
 
“Electronic business is an approach to achieving business goals in which 
technology for information exchange enables or facilitates execution of 
activities in and across value chains, as well as supporting decision 
making that underlies those activities.” (Holsapple & Singh 2000, 159.)  
 
E-business comprises transactions and communication over the Internet, i.e. B2B, 
B2C, C2C, mobile commerce, e-government, e-learning, e-publishing, online 
communities, and social networks. Organizations can have a varying degree of e-business 
involvement, starting from no involvement at all (i.e. selling physical goods by using only 
brick and mortar premises), through partial involvement (i.e. using a mix of electronic 
and traditional distribution channels) to full involvement. (Xu & Quaddus 2009.) 
E-business can be categorized in different ways. One of them is a classification 
according to the type of system involved. Based on Turban et al. (2008), Xu and Quaddus 
(2009) developed the following model of e-business application types: 
Figure 5 Categorizing e-business according to type of application 
 
Source: Xu & Quaddus (2009, 8–10). 
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The first type of application are electronic markets, which refer to a marketplace where 
buyers and sellers are connected. It enables the buying and selling of goods and services. 
In electronic markets it is likely that the participants do not know each other before the 
online transaction takes place. The deployed technology is usually an open system which 
allows anyone to gain access and participate in transactions. The second type of 
application are inter-organizational systems, which facilitate information flow between 
organizations. These include electronic data interchange and extranets. The third type are 
intra-organizational systems, such as intranets, which facilitate information flow within 
an organization. The last type of application are service delivery systems, which provide 
services for the customer. Online banking, online learning, and other online services 
belong to this category. (Xu & Quaddus 2009.) 
Another way to categorize e-business is by the type of transaction taking place (Turban 
et al. 2006). This approach distinguishes between business-to-business transactions (i.e. 
transactions conducted among businesses), business-to-consumer transactions (i.e. 
transactions between an organization and its retail customers), intra-business transactions 
(i.e. transactions within an organization), and consumers-to-consumers transactions (i.e. 
transactions between consumers). Further types of transactions include mobile 
commerce, e-government, e-learning, e-publishing, peer-to-peer applications, social 
networks, and online communities, only to mention a few. (Xu & Quaddus 2009.) 
An important concept of e-business is the business model used to generate revenue. 
Turban et al. (2006, 20) have identified the following types of e-business models: 
 
• Sales generating revenue from selling merchandise or services online; 
• Transaction fees: earning a commission based on the volume of transactions 
made or fees per transaction; 
• Subscription fees: fixed amount, usually monthly for services provided; 
• Advertising fees; 
• Affiliate fees: receiving commissions for referring customers to others’ sites; 
• Payment for usage; and 
• Licensing fees. 
 
In addition to generating revenue, the e-business should create value for customers, 
organizations, and other relevant parties. The business model is critical to the viability of 
an online business and its failure can lead to the failure of the whole business. (Xu & 
Quaddus 2009.) 
Foreign divestment: Academic literature uses various terms to talk about foreign 
divestments and until today there seems to be no consensus about which is the right one. 
In addition to the frequently used ‘foreign divestment’ (e.g. Boddewyn 1979; Benito 
1997b), other terms seen in the literature are ‘foreign market exit’ (e.g. Sousa & Tan 
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2015), and ‘de-internationalization’ (Benito & Welch 1997). Furthermore, ‘divestiture’ 
(Boddewyn 1979) is another, yet not so commonly used term for divestment. 
Despite the variety in the terms being used, the definition remains broadly speaking 
the same. Chopra et al. (1978, 14) have defined foreign divestment as “the reduction of 
ownership percentage in an active foreign operation, on either a voluntary or involuntary 
basis through complete or partial sale, liquidation, expropriation and/or 
nationalization”. One year later Boddewyn (1979, 21) followed by defining divestment 
as “the deliberate and voluntary liquidation or sale of all or of a major part of an active 
operation”. Sousa and Tan (2015, 84) defined foreign market exit as a “firm’s voluntary 
decision to liquidate or sell an active operation in a foreign market”. In this thesis the 
definition of Benito and Welch (1997, 9) is used as the working definition for foreign 
divestment. It is the best fit when describing divestments in e-business where companies 
often do not have any physical entities in a foreign country that would have to be sold or 
liquidated. According to Benito and Welch (1997, 9), divestments can refer to “any 
voluntary or forced actions that reduce a company’s engagement in or exposure to 
current cross-border activities”. 
Another aspect that should be noted when studying divestments, is whether it is a 
domestic or foreign divestment. Boddewyn (1983a) identified several differences 
between foreign and domestic divestment decisions. First, foreign discrepancy is harder 
to detect due to various economic, political, social, and cultural differences between the 
home and host country. Second, in foreign divestments the barriers to exit are lower due 
to the relatively small size of the foreign affiliate, the interrelatedness problems, and the 
lack of emotional involvement of managers. Moreover, in case of a ‘new man’, that is 
when a new manager is hired to provide the impetus to divestment, the foreign divestment 
decision is even easier because there is no commitment to any one investment in 
particular. Boddewyn further argued that persuasion of superiors is facilitated by cultural 
differences and emotional detachment between home and host country. Justification of 
the divestment decision was found to be more complex to host country nationals due to 
political and cultural dimensions involved. Finally, Boddewyn concluded that 
organizational learning is simpler in foreign divestment because the ‘victims’ are far away 
and the decision is thus more impersonal. Even if the foreign divestment was a bad 
experience for the firm and the people involved, there was still the opportunity to learn 
how to avoid it or how to do it better next time. As defined in the previous section, the 
objective of this research is to examine solely foreign divestments. 
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2 THEORIES ON FOREIGN DIVESTMENTS 
2.1 An overview of theories on foreign divestment decisions 
Over the years there has been a number of researchers attempting to explain the factors 
contributing to foreign divestment decisions. This chapter will provide an overview of 
the different frameworks after which the divestment model of Benito (1997b) is presented 
in more detail. 
Boddewyn: In his article, Boddewyn (1979) integrated the findings of a number of 
U.S., European, and Japanese studies dealing with divestments. He was able to identify 
the following key foreign divestment factors: (1) financial considerations; (2) poor pre-
investment analysis; (3) adverse environmental conditions; (4) lack of fit and resources; 
(5) structural and organizational factors; (6) external initiating pressures; and (7) 
foreignness and national differences (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 Key foreign divestment factors 
 
Source: Created by the author based on Boddewyn (1979, 22–26). 
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Financial factors were clearly found to be the predominating motivation of 
divestments. These were associated with prolonged poor performance of the foreign 
affiliate with bad future prospects, inability of the headquarters to sustain further losses, 
or lack of resources to finance the necessary modernization or expansion. Boddewyn 
argued that a common factor leading to bad financial performance is poor preparation. 
Foreign investments that were made without a sufficient pre-investment analysis often 
turned out to be failures and led to early divestments. However, Boddewyn stated that a 
poor financial situation alone was not sufficient to generate divestments and other factors 
and processes should be considered too. 
Economic, political, social, and cultural conditions in the home and host country were 
reported to affect the current performance of a firm. The findings implied that 
environmental factors cause risks and opportunities that can influence divestment 
decisions. What is more, a lack of fit and resources was found to contribute to foreign 
divestments. The article stated that companies have started to have a more explicit 
strategic view of their opportunities and resources which in turn has led to rationalization 
of their operations. Boddewyn further added the impact of the lack of managerial 
resources on divestments. Foreign operations require managers who are able to cope with 
size and complexity, and firms were found to be prone to underestimate the challenges of 
integrating foreign acquisitions. 
Structural and organizational factors were also identified to explain divestments. Poor 
communication between a headquarters and its foreign affiliates, differing managerial 
styles, organizational changes, and bad organizational structures often generated 
disagreements and ultimately divestments. Moreover, Boddewyn found that in many 
cases restrictions of the government led to voluntary or semi voluntary divestments. 
External initiating pressures refer to growing national or regional policies that can affect 
the company’s business in a foreign country.  
Finally, foreign-owned multinational companies were discovered to be more likely to 
divest their foreign operations than locally owned firms in EEC countries. This was 
explained by the existence of national differences regarding legal restrictions, 
terminations costs, as well as union and employee opposition. 
Godar: Drawing on existing literature, Godar (1997) developed a model to investigate 
foreign divestments driven by proactive versus reactive motives. Furthermore, she 
examined potential barriers to divestment in order to determine their impact on 
divestment decisions (Figure 7). Foreign investment theory provided the basis for reactive 
divestments, while proactive divestments were based on transaction cost theory. The 
concept of information filtering derived from agency theory and the perception of success 
or failure was added from failure literature. Finally, the barriers of divestment came from 
domestic divestment literature. The model was tested on 43 U.S. firms from varying 
industries.  
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Figure 7 Reactive vs. proactive divestment model 
 
Source: Godar (1997, 31). 
As illustrated in the model, reactive divestment-decisions are driven by unfavorable 
changes in the company’s macro- and/or micro-environment. These changes lead to 
unfavorable changes at either the corporate or the subsidiary level, leading to a negative 
perception of the subsidiary’s performance. If the company is able to overcome the 
barriers to divestment, this perception will lead to divestiture of the subsidiary. The 
drivers of proactive divestments are defined as potential changes in the macro- and/or 
micro-environment which lead to a change in corporate strategy. 
When a company evaluates the divestment of a foreign unit it has to consider both 
macro- and micro-environmental issues in the host country. Macro-environmental issues 
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affect all firms that are operating in a given foreign country, but not equally. The degree 
of impact varies due to mitigating factors such as the company’s ties to government 
officials. If unanticipated changes in the business environment affect the profitability of 
a foreign subsidiary the firm may start considering divesting it. However, divestment will 
only occur if the company perceives that the specific subsidiary operation will be affected 
by these changes. Micro-environmental issues that may lead to foreign divestment are 
market size (Torneden 1975), change in competition, and change in customer behavior. 
These changes are considered to threaten the continuous profitability of a given foreign 
unit (Godar 1997). When there are negative changes in either or both of the environments, 
the subsidiary performance may be negatively affected. 
The perception of foreign subsidiary performance derives from the information that is 
received by the headquarters and the perceived significance of any negative information 
about the subsidiary. The model suggests that the perception of subsidiary performance 
is the outcome of both the subsidiary’s actual performance as well as the company’s 
overall situation. Earlier literature has suggested that financial performance of a 
subsidiary has an impact on how the unit is perceived by the company. The subsidiary is 
likely to become a divestment prospect when there is a perception of financial need, weak 
management, or decreased performance. 
Another factor influencing divestment decisions is the overall situation of a company. 
If a company’s performance changes in a negative manner it may re-evaluate its foreign 
investments. Declining profitability of a company will lead to cost reductions and 
rationalization of operations. This may result in a more rigorous evaluation of foreign 
subsidiary performance. 
Godar proposes that barriers to withdraw from a market only exist in reactive 
divestments. In proactive divestments companies are less likely to consider barriers due 
to larger strategic changes. Decisions about individual subsidiaries may seem irrelevant 
when the focus is on broader issues. 
According to the model, proactively motivated divestments are driven by anticipated 
unfavorable changes in the environment. These changes will lead the company to change 
its strategy and potentially reallocate its resources before the environment actually 
changes. The strategic change can be an entire elimination of the product line produced 
or serviced by the foreign subsidiary, moving the product line to another unit, or 
outsourcing the product. Any of these changes would lead to divestment of the foreign 
unit. 
Jagersma and van Gorp: An extensive field study was made by Jagersma and van 
Gorp in 2003. It analyzes the motives behind Dutch multinational companies’ 
international divestments and the following consequences. The study examined the 
following generic forces impacting international divestment decisions: (1) poor financial 
performance; (2) alternative local or global growth opportunities; (3) follow the market 
27 
leader behavior; (4) unfavorable political climate; (5) absence of strategic policy synergy; 
(6) lack of competitive edge; and (7) conflicting policy views. Figure 8 illustrates seven 
international divestment models that were reviewed and provided the framework for the 
empirical research. 
Figure 8 Dominant causes leading to international divestments 
 
Source: Created by the author based on Jagersma and van Gorp (2003, 51). 
Jagersma and van Gorp stated that poor financial performance is often caused by lack 
of preparation. Enthusiastic managers who are driven by their personal ego or quarterly 
figures sometimes underestimate the importance of solid preparation. In addition, 
financial performance can be affected by difficulties in building up sales internationally. 
This may require substantial financial resources from a company and in some cases the 
disproportionate burdens become so high that a company decides to cease its foreign 
activities. Selling international loss-making activities can generate substantial funds. In 
order to achieve more profitable overall operations many multinational companies end up 
divesting their foreign activities. 
More attractive growth opportunities elsewhere are another factor motivating 
companies to divest their foreign operations. Managers may decide to reallocate resources 
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when there is a chance to achieve higher profitability in other markets. The emergence of 
high growth geographic markets can be an example why a company decides to relocate 
its international activities (Porter 1990).  
The third factor, following the market leader, is a common strategy in oligopolistic 
industries. Not only does this strategy apply to international expansion, but it can also be 
used in direct foreign divestments. When the market leader starts divesting foreign 
activities in a certain market, others in the industry may subsequently start divesting 
similar activities. This can be seen specifically in the phenomenon of ‘multi-market 
competition’ (Nalebuff & Brandenburger 1996). 
Jagersma and van Gorp continued by explaining how political climate can play a 
significant role in the decision to discontinue foreign activities in a country. Local 
governments are in a position to impose restrictions on a foreign company’s operations 
and to adversely influence cost levels. This may be done for example in order to favor 
local companies in the guest country. Moreover, a new regime or a change of attitude 
towards a multinational company may cause problems, especially in politically less stable 
countries. 
Furthermore, a change in strategic direction may cause that international activities no 
longer belong to the company’s strategic core activity. In other words, there is a lack of 
strategic policy synergy. Many multinational companies decide to rationalize their 
international business scope (Hamel & Prahalad 1994) and create value for the 
shareholders by divesting foreign activities (Jagersma & van Gorp 2003). 
The sixth divestment model is lacking competitive edge. Given the increasingly 
growing international competition as well as the ever more complex and rapidly changing 
international landscape, it is no surprise that companies are struggling to stay profitable. 
Many multinational companies must sell their products at lowest possible cost while still 
maintaining the highest possible quality. International activities that are not able to 
compete in a fierce market must be divested. 
To conclude, Jagersma and van Gorp examined the effect of conflicting policy views 
on international divestments. Jagersma and van Gorp claimed that conflicting policy 
views apply only to international alliances, such as international distribution contracts or 
joint ventures. The relationship between a multinational company and its partner can often 
be more complicated than expected. Sometimes the partners’ general views on how to run 
business diverge to the point where it is wiser for one of the parties to withdraw from the 
collaboration. 
Sousa and Tan: Sousa and Tan (2015) focused specifically on the effects of strategic 
fit and international performance as well as the moderating impact of cultural distance 
and international experience on a company’s decision to exit a foreign market. The model 
presented in their study is based on fit theory together with moderation contingent logic 
(Figure 9). 
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Figure 9 Conceptual model explaining the exit from a foreign market 
 
Source: Sousa and Tan (2015, 85). 
Sousa and Tan defined internal strategic fit as a coalignment or match between a 
foreign affiliate’s strategy and the headquarters’ strategy. When a foreign affiliate ceases 
to fit the overall strategy of a firm it is likely to be divested. This allows the headquarters 
to focus on its ‘core’ business and become more efficient by focusing resources on units 
with a better strategic fit.  
Based on earlier studies, Sousa and Tan expected financial motives to be another 
crucial factor influencing a firm’s divestment decision. Poor economic performance 
implies that a foreign affiliate’s strategy has failed and that future performance will 
continue to be poor if no changes are made. 
Furthermore, Sousa and Tan proposed that cultural distance plays a moderating role in 
a multinational company’s foreign activities and can therefore affect the decision to exit 
a foreign market. Cultural distance is a widely used and recognized concept to assess the 
differences between countries. Common differences can be seen for example in customer 
preferences, competition patterns, and business rules (De Mooij & Hofstede 2002). 
Moreover, cultural distance implies differences in managerial values, mindsets, norms, 
and practices (Luo et al. 2001).  A large cultural distance between the headquarters and 
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its foreign affiliate makes it difficult for managers to adapt to the local environment 
(Hultman et al. 2009). Therefore, managers are less motivated to change the strategy of a 
foreign affiliate and more likely to divest the foreign activities. 
Finally, Sousa and Tan argued that international experience plays an important role in 
supporting a firm’s international activities. Earlier overseas experience, professional 
foreign direct investment experience, and training in international business provide 
managers with a variety of insights leading to a more extensive knowledge base 
(Herrmann & Datta 2006). International expertise enables managers to be in a better 
position to deal with challenges caused by large cultural distance (Herrmann & Datta 
2006) and to develop solutions for potential pitfalls (Dow & Larimo 2009). Moreover, 
managers with international experience are more confident in overcoming the uncertainty 
and risks associated with culturally distant markets. Therefore, international experience 
is expected to counteract the negative moderating effects of high cultural distance. 
2.2 Divestment model by Benito 
The theoretical framework by Benito (1997b) was chosen for this thesis because it 
incorporates all the most significant factors of the above discussed foreign divestment 
models. None of the other frameworks include all the factors that are presented in Benito’s 
model but rather parts of it. The few factors that are presented in some of the other models 
but are missing in Benito’s model were not found to be significant in explaining foreign 
divestment decisions. Thus, the simple and comprehensive model of Benito was a logical 
choice to provide the framework to guide this research. 
As discussed before, earlier studies have suggested a number of factors that may 
trigger a divestment decision. The main streams in explaining these decisions have 
derived from economics, strategic management, and international business literature. The 
former, economics, focuses mainly on the performance of a foreign unit and on the 
competitive environment in which it operates. Economics literature suggests that adverse 
changes in these factors can lead to divestment of the operation. Strategic management 
literature focuses on the strategic relation between a foreign unit and the headquarters’ 
core business. Diversification moves are suggested to have a greater risk to be divested 
in the future. Finally, international business literature considers the problems of doing 
business in a foreign country. Unfamiliar settings and/or a complex integration process 
of the chosen method of operation are likely to increase difficulties of running a foreign 
unit. However, international experience has been recognized to moderate the impact of 
these challenges. 




1. The competitive and political stability of the international environment. 
2. The current and expected performance of a foreign affiliate, i.e. the 
attractiveness of current operations. 
3. The governance problems associated with foreign operations. These depend on 
the chosen operation mode as well as the unfamiliarity of the foreign setting, 
and are moderated by the parent company’s ability to deal with such problems. 
4. The strategic fit between the parent company and a foreign unit, i.e. the degree 
to which a foreign subsidiary is related to its parent, and whether the parent has 
a well-defined core-business or not. 
 
Benito further adds that when examining the influence of these factors on a firm’s exit 
decision, incentives and barriers to exit should be considered too. They are expected to 
have a moderating effect and are therefore included in the framework as a moderator 
between the four factors and the probability of exit. The decision to stay or to exit is 
presented as a function of incentives and barriers to exit in Figure 10. 
Figure 10 The decision to stay or to exit 
 
Source: Benito (1997b, 316). 
For a company to consider divesting a foreign unit there must be a positive incentive 
to exit. Benito argues that positive incentives exist whenever current profits, or expected 
profits, over a relevant period of time fail to meet a satisfactory rate of return. However, 
even high incentives to exit will not lead to divestiture unless the magnitude of incentives 
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is larger than that of the barriers to exit. Barriers to exit derive primarily from the 
existence of assets that have a higher value in their current use than in their best alternative 
use. Benito (1997b, 317) states that "in terms of their explanatory value [notions of 
incentives and barriers to exit] constitute rather ‘empty’ concepts". 
In his attempt to integrate the various contributions found in literature, Benito takes a 
relatively broad frame of reference and does not confine it to any particular field like 
economics, management, or strategy. The outcome is a simple and unifying framework, 
which aims to explain why and under which circumstances foreign market exit is likely 
to take place (Figure 11). 
Figure 11 Divestment of foreign operations: A framework 
 
Source: Benito (1997b, 318). 
Benito’s model presents four main factors that are likely to influence a firm’s 
probability of divesting operations: environmental stability, attractiveness of current 
operations, strategic fit, and governmental issues. These factors are moderated by their 
respective effects on the firm’s incentives and barriers to exit. Benito argues that his 
framework is rather general and may be used in both foreign and domestic contexts. The 
role of various factors in foreign divestments is presented in more detail below. 
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2.2.1 Environmental stability 
The factors leading to foreign divestment can be seen as the reversal of FDI (Boddewyn 
1983b). Changes in the environment of the foreign activity can affect the adequacy and 
profitability of FDI as an operation method (Benito 1997b). Using Dunning’s (1979) 
‘eclectic theory of international production’ as a foundation for his framework, 
Boddewyn contends that foreign divestment is likely to take place when Dunning’s 
conditions for FDI cease to be present. 
The central hypothesis in Dunning’s theory is that “a firm will engage in foreign direct 
investment if three conditions are satisfied [simultaneously]” (Dunning 1979, 275): 
 
1. The company possesses ownership-specific advantages. 
2. Assuming that condition (1) is satisfied, the company must have an incentive 
to internalize its advantages, i.e. it must be more beneficial for the company to 
extend its own activities rather than externalizing its advantages. 
3. Assuming that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, it must be more profitable 
for the company to exploit these advantages outside its home country. 
 
Based on this theory, Boddewyn (1983b) translated Dunning’s three conditions into a 
proto-theory of foreign divestment. According to his theory, foreign direct divestment 
takes place whenever (Boddewyn 1983b, 347–348): 
 
1. A firm ceases to possess net competitive advantages over firms of other 
nationalities. 
2. Or, even if the firm retains net competitive advantages, it no longer finds it 
beneficial to use them itself rather than sell or rent them to foreign firms – that 
is, the firm no longer considers it profitable to ‘internalize’ these advantages. 
3. Or, the firm no longer finds it profitable to utilize its internalized net 
competitive advantage outside its home country – that is, it is now more 
advantageous to serve foreign markets by exports and the home market by 
home production, or to abandon foreign and/or home markets altogether. 
 
The latter condition will be discussed later on. In this section the interest lies in the 
first two points, i.e. the erosion of ownership and internationalization advantages. These 
result from changes in the company’s competitive and political environment. Benito 
argues that R&D intensity and country risk in particular can significantly impact the 
environmental stability of a foreign operation.  
R&D intensity: Ownership advantages largely derive from investments in research 
and development as well as marketing activities. Industries that are research and 
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development intensive often constitute rapidly changing competitive environments 
(Audretsch 1994). This in turn can threaten the advantages gained from R&D (Shapiro 
1983). What is more, due to the high risks associated with R&D investments, further 
investments may in fact increase the risk of subsequent failure. However, giving up on 
R&D projects is not a viable alternative either. Given the rapidly changing and technology 
intensive nature of such industries, this may lead to failure even faster. 
Country risk: Foreign operations face a higher risk due to unexpected changes in the 
economic, social, and political environment of a host country. A firm’s competitive 
ability is dependent on actions and events that it cannot control, such as the behavior of a 
given host country regarding the regulatory environment, economic policies, and 
discriminatory government actions. 
Country risk may determine a divestment decision in several ways. Political risk can 
lead to adverse host country actions and leave the firm with no other option than to divest. 
Moreover, political risk may change in a negative direction and hence affect the perceived 
benefit of continuing foreign operations. Finally, in case that the company wants to retreat 
from a foreign market, country risk may heighten the barriers to exit by complicating the 
sale of the foreign affiliate. Even at a low price there is likely to be a lack of interest. 
2.2.2 Attractiveness of current operations 
Economic performance of the foreign unit: The profitability of a foreign affiliate plays 
an important role in the decision of whether it should be retained or not. It is perhaps the 
most obvious factor leading to foreign divestments. However, Benito notes that foreign 
units with high productivity are the ones most likely to be sold off. This can be explained 
due to the interest of potential acquirers who may be willing to pay a good price for the 
unit while it is performing well. 
Economic growth in the host country: Another factor affecting the attractiveness of 
a particular location is the more general economic situation. As the ‘eclectic theory’ of 
international production indicates, a host country needs to have specific location 
advantages that make it interesting for firms to invest in that country. Trade barriers and 
transport costs can give rise to country or location specific advantages that lead firms to 
favor FDI. In addition, countries with favorable economic conditions are likely to attract 
more inward FDI. Particularly market size and market growth can have a significant 
impact on international investment location decisions. 
Moreover, the ability of a host country to remain attractive for FDI can be expected to 
be dependent on the growth of its economy. Given that host countries are competing with 
each other for FDI, it is necessary for a host country to obtain growth rates that are 
sufficiently high compared to other potential locations. 
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2.2.3 Strategic fit 
Literature has pointed out that diversification, particularly into unrelated industries, often 
increases the risk of divestment (Pennings et al. 1994). Various explanations have been 
offered for this phenomenon. First, unrelated moves seldom support economies of scale 
and scope (Lecraw 1984). Second, diversification exposes the firm to an unfamiliar 
context, which in turn increases the likelihood of mistakes (Pennings et al. 1994). 
Moreover, unrelated expansion makes it difficult to build inter-firm linkages (Pennings 
et al. 1994), and finally it increases the company’s governance cost without necessarily 
leading to lower production costs or higher returns (Reve 1990). 
Another stream of literature argues that diversification by itself increases the 
propensity to divest. The emotional attachment is less strong in diversified than in single-
industry companies, which lowers the barriers to exit a market. What is more, Caves and 
Porter (1976) suggest that diversified companies are more flexible and can thus demand 
for a higher rate of return. If a foreign affiliate fails to achieve the target, it may be 
divested quickly and the cash reinvested in other operations. Single-industry companies, 
however, often accept lower rates of returns, given that they face significantly higher exit 
barriers due to sunk costs in specific assets. 
2.2.4 Governance issues 
Foreign operations take place in cultures which are lesser known to the company. This 
requires internationalizing companies to learn about and adjust to foreign cultures and 
can increase their risk of failure (Barkema et al. 1996). Literature indicates that problems 
associated with acculturation depend principally on cultural distance, the mode of 
operation, and the international experience of the company. 
Cultural distance: Challenges caused by cultural distance vary considerably 
depending whether the company enters a neighboring country or a culturally distant 
country located far away. Cultural similarity between the home and the host country is 
expected to increase the probability of FDI. Furthermore, closeness between the countries 
may facilitate monitoring and coordination of production and marketing activities and 
thus alleviate problems at later operative stages. Consequently, the incidence of problems 
that may motivate divestment of a foreign operation is likely to be higher in culturally 
distant host countries. 
According to Boddewyn (1983a), foreign divestment appears to be an easier decision 
when compared with domestic divestment. The headquarters’ managers are both 
physically and emotionally more detached from foreign units, hence making the decision 
to divest more impersonal. Drawing upon Boddewyn’s conclusions, Benito argues that if 
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perceived barriers to exit depend on distance, exit barriers would be expected to be lower 
for remote foreign affiliates than for units that are located in neighboring and/or culturally 
close countries. 
Operation method: Foreign market entries often involve a joint venture with a foreign 
partner or the acquisition of an existing operation in the host country. The integration of 
different corporate cultures can already be challenging in a purely domestic context, but 
even more so when integrating foreign cultures. Barkema et al. (1996) point out that both 
national and corporate cultures have an impact on the international venture.  
Using a foreign partner when entering a new market is a double-edged sword: while it 
may help reduce entry barriers for the company, it can also lead to problems associated 
with the integration process. The parent company is likely to face challenges when 
reconciling institutionalized organizational practices, such as decision-making 
procedures and corporate policies (Barkema et al. 1996). As a result, international joint 
ventures are often unstable or perceived as unsuccessful by the partners involved 
(Harrigan 1988; Kogut 1988). 
Furthermore, foreign affiliates often face a lack of commitment from managers of the 
parent company. Managerial attachment takes time to build and may not yet be there in 
the critical initial phases of the integration process. On the contrary, internal start-ups 
often get considerably more support – even when less successful – from managers who 
are reluctant to divest what they have created themselves (Li 1995). 
International experience: Problems associated with the lack of knowledge about 
foreign locations, cultural distance, and the integration process itself, are not always 
constant. Studies have shown that when expanding abroad, firms acquire knowledge 
about foreign markets and about how to deal with partners from a different cultural 
background. International experience can be measured as the number of prior foreign 
investments undertaken by the firm, or as the firm’s prior experience in the same foreign 
country. It provides positive learning effects and thus improves the longevity of ventures. 
(Barkema et al. 1996.) 
Firms with international experience are likely to be better in evaluating potential sites 
and cooperation partners for a FDI, which in turn reduces the risk for subsequent 
divestment. Moreover, as experience is accumulated it becomes easier for a firm to avoid 
common problems associated with foreign affiliates and to come up with workable 
solutions for potential pitfalls. 
Finally, experienced firms know how to correctly respond to changes in the foreign 
environment, such as changes in exchange rates and pricing. They are better in estimating 
whether a change can be interpreted as being normal fluctuation in the market or if it is a 
problem that can be solved if appropriate action is taken. Thus, firms with higher levels 
of experience are likely to have a more tolerant approach to deviations from the expected. 
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Benito further adds that factors other than those discussed before may also have an 
impact on the exit decision. First, he suggests that the size of the parent company may 
have an impact. However, previous research has found mixed results regarding how size 
affects the probability of divestment (Li 1995). Another potentially significant control 
variable is the age of the foreign affiliate. The period of time until a start-up becomes 
profitable can be long, which sometimes leads impatient investors to prematurely 
terminate the operation. Furthermore, new operations are often perceived as ‘risky’ and 
may therefore have difficulties in obtaining the resources they need to survive. On the 
organizational side, it can be argued that old subsidiaries have closer linkages to the 
headquarters which makes dissolution more difficult (Hannan & Freeman 1984). 
However, older units are likely to use less efficient technology, and to produce products 
that are in the mature and declining phases of their life cycle. This would support the 
divestment of these operations (Harrigan 1980). This study will only consider the factors 
described in the theoretical model, given that these additional factors have been found to 
have mixed results on divestments. 
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Research approach 
Merriam (2014, 3–4) describes research as “a systematic process by which we know more 
about something than we did before engaging in the process”. It can be divided into the 
categories of basic and applied research. While applied research focuses on a particular 
discipline, basic research is interested in a phenomenon and aims to know more about it. 
Thus, this research can be qualified as basic research. 
The chosen research approach is a qualitative case study. A qualitative research aims 
to discover how things actually are (Gillham 2000). The research objective as well as the 
research questions strive for a deeper understanding about the phenomenon which could 
not be achieved by quantitative means. Qualitative research is needed to understand the 
phenomenon and to leave room for possible unexpected information. 
There are various types of qualitative research strategies. The most commonly used 
approaches are basic qualitative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, 
ethnography, narrative analysis, critical qualitative research, and case study. (Merriam 
2014.) Again, the chosen approach was determined by the research objective and research 
questions. Case study was seen as the best fit for this research because of its distinctive 
features. Merriam (2014, 40) defines case study as “an in-depth description and analysis 
of a bounded system”. The end product is explanatory in nature and provides a holistic 
description of the studied phenomenon. As Bromley (1986) points out, case studies get 
the researcher as close to the subject of interest as they possible can. A case study can be 
seen more as “a choice of what is to be studied” rather than a methodological choice 
(Stake 2005). Here the ‘what’ refers to a bounded system (Smith 1978), in this study 
specifically to foreign divestments of e-business companies. Merriam (2014, 42–44) 
explains that by concentrating on a single situation, event, or phenomenon, the researcher 
“aims to uncover the interaction of significant factors characteristic of the phenomenon”. 
The cases in this study are important for what they will reveal about foreign divestments 
in the e-business sector. As noted in Chapter 1.2., there have been only few case studies 
on foreign divestments, and none on foreign divestments in the e-business sector 
specifically.  
Stake (1981) claims that previously unknown relationships and variables are likely to 
emerge from case studies and will thus lead to a rethinking of the phenomenon being 
studied. He continues by arguing that case study knowledge differentiates from other 
research knowledge in the following four ways: (1) it is more concrete and resonates with 
our own experience; (2) it is more contextual as our experiences and case study 
knowledge are rooted in context; (3) it is more developed by reader interpretation, as 
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readers bring their own experience and understanding to a case study; and (4) it is based 
more on reference populations determined by the reader. 
As this study focuses on the characteristics of foreign divestments, a descriptive study 
is in order. Merriam emphasizes that here the results are limited to describing the 
phenomenon rather than predicting how it will behave in the future. Case study offers a 
means to examine the multiple potentially important variables explaining foreign 
divestments. Erickson (1986) argues that since the general lies in the particular, the 
findings of a particular case can be transferred to other similar situations. 
3.2 Data collection 
The method of choice in this research was non-probability sampling. As Honigmann 
(1982) describes, non-probability sampling methods are logical when the researcher aims 
to solve qualitative problems, such as discovering what occurs, the implications of what 
occurs, and the relationships linking occurrences. The most common form of non-
probability sampling is purposeful sampling, which is used when the objective is to 
discover, understand, and gain insight into a phenomenon. Hence, the investigator has to 
select a sample from which the most can be learned. (Merriam 2014.) 
As an alternative for the term purposeful sampling, LeCompte and Preissle (1993) 
suggest the term ‘criterion-based selection’. Here the idea is to create a list of the essential 
attributes for the study and to proceed to find a case that will match the list. In this 
research, the criteria were chosen to be as follows: 
 
1. The company is an e-business company. 
2. The company has expanded to foreign markets. 
3. The company has deliberately divested operations from at least one foreign 
market. 
 
The search for eligible case companies included various methods, such as contacting 
numerous experts in the field as well as university professors, approaching e-business 
companies directly, doing online research, and reading news articles. Potential case 
companies were evaluated based on their ability to match the predetermined profile. The 
original idea was to interview several companies and to make an extensive case study, 
i.e. creating generalizable theoretical constructs by comparing a number of cases 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). However, some difficulties arose from the topic of 
research as it turned out that there was not much public information about e-business 
companies that had divested foreign operations. Moreover, the companies that were found 
to have divested operations seemed to be reluctant to talk about the reasons that had led 
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to their foreign market exit. All these companies were contacted and asked to participate 
in an interview. Only two of them answered to the request, Lyyti and Groupon. Due to 
these boundaries the scope of this research was narrowed down to two case examples. 
Both companies were active in the e-business sector, had expanded to foreign markets, 
and had deliberately divested operations from at least one foreign market. Lyyti and 
Groupon differed from each other in many aspects such as size, pace of 
internationalization, business model, and customers. Thus, the results were expected to 
provide information about foreign divestments from two different perspectives. 
The second step in purposeful sampling in qualitative case studies is to do sampling 
within the case (Merriam 2014). Here the method of choice was again purposeful 
sampling, more specifically snowball, chain, or network sampling. Citing Merriam, this 
strategy involves identifying the key participants in the case and asking each one to refer 
to other participants.  
After identifying Lyyti as a potential case company, the CEO of the company was 
contacted and asked to participate in an interview. As the CEO of the company, Petri 
Hollmén was a logical first choice to interview about the case. He had been the one 
making the final decisions when it came to Lyyti’s foreign operations in Germany. When 
Hollmén agreed to an interview, he was asked who else had been involved in Lyyti’s 
German operations. He then recommended to interview Antti Vaahtoranta, who had been 
in charge of the German market from which Lyyti had divested its operations. 
Vaahtoranta had been working at Lyyti since 2012 and his current responsibilities 
included customer training, distribution, and for some parts also customer service. 
In Groupon Finland’s case the procedure was similar. However, as Groupon was no 
longer active in Finland and there was no direct contact information available for the 
headquarters of Groupon in the U.S., the situation was more complicated. First, the 
customer service of Groupon U.S. was contacted and asked to forward the interview 
request to the headquarters or to give out their direct contact information. The answer was 
that they could not help with this issue. The next step was contacting the previous country 
manager of Groupon Finland, Risto Juntunen, and he agreed to an interview. Juntunen 
started at Groupon Finland in January 2011 as a sales manager. Six months later he 
became country manager and was responsible for Groupon’s operations in Finland. This 
included managing sales, sales targets, and sales growth. Many of Groupon’s operations 
were managed internationally and Juntunen’s role was to ensure that everything was done 
correctly in Finland. 
When asked for further key participants in Groupon Finland’s divestment case 
Juntunen referred me to Hannu Säkkinen, prior head of HR of Groupon Finland and 
member of the board. Säkkinen replied in a phone conversation that he would not be able 
to participate in an interview because he had signed a contract with an obligation of 
confidentiality when Groupon divested operations from Finland. Furthermore, Säkkinen 
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was confident that other key participants who had worked for Groupon Finland had also 
signed a similar contract. When asked for key participants outside of Finland, Säkkinen 
referred me to Emma Coleman, head of communications in Groupon’s EMEA segment 
(consisting of Europe, the Middle East and Africa). Coleman was situated in London and 
was first approached via email. The reply was that she would not be participating in an 
interview regarding Groupon Finland’s divestment: “I am sorry but we have made our 
public statements on this and there is nothing else I can share.” Based on this reply the 
decision was made to gather the empirical data in Groupon’s case from Juntunen’s 
interview as well as from the public statements that had been made on Groupon’s foreign 
market exit. 
Apart from the public statements in Groupon’s case the empirical data was collected 
through expert interviews. Interviews were considered to be the best method as detailed 
information regarding divestments was found to be difficult to obtain in written form or 
from public sources. Furthermore, interviews were hoped to result in a rich and 
comprehensive data set that would be hard to achieve with other methods. 
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2015) describe three different kinds of interviews: (1) 
structured and standardized interviews; (2) guided and semi structured interviews; and 
(3) unstructured, informal, open and narrative interviews. In structured and standardized 
interviews, the interviewer has a pre-designed script that determines how the interview is 
done and there is little or no possibility to respond to any particular concerns of the 
interviewee. The major disadvantage of standardized interviews is the lack of flexibility. 
Eriksson and Kovalainen argue that these kinds of interviews may be too restrictive to be 
used as the main source of data in qualitative research. In guided and semi structured 
interviews the interviewer uses a pre-designed outline of topics or themes, but still has 
the possibility to make some changes to the questions during the interview. The method 
of a semi structured interview allows the interviewer to adapt to the situation at hand and 
to follow up with more questions when needed. The tone of the interview is usually 
conversational and relatively informal. The third group of interviews are unstructured, 
narrative, informal and open interviews. Here the interviewer does not use a formal 
interview protocol and is free to move the conversation in any direction of interest. This 
type of interview is often used when the aim is to examine the topic of research in depth 
and from the interviewees point of view. 
In this thesis the chosen method was a semi structured interview. The interviews were 
guided by a predetermined list of open-ended questions based on the theoretical 
framework of Benito (1997b). The interview themes are presented in the 
operationalization chart (Table 1) as well as in Appendix 2. 
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Table 1 Operationalization chart 
 
 
The operationalization chart presents the objective of this research and the linkages 
between the sub-questions and the theoretical framework. As seen in the chart, the 
interview themes derive directly from the theoretical framework. Benito’s notion of 
barriers and incentives to exit is not included in this thesis as it is not relevant in 
explaining which factors lead to foreign divestment in e-business. 
The interviews were done face-to-face. After being in contact with Vaahtoranta 
beforehand via email, a personal appointment was scheduled. The interview themes were 
sent to Vaahtoranta via email one week before the interview so that he could get familiar 
with them. The interview was done on March 21st 2016 in Lyyti’s office in Turku. As 
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Vaahtoranta had requested beforehand, the interview was done in German. German is 
Vaahtoranta’s first language and thus the bias from speaking in a foreign language could 
be minimized. Furthermore, when speaking in their first language interviewees usually 
feel more comfortable and give more detailed answers to questions. The interview lasted 
approximately one hour and was recorded with the phone. The transcription was done on 
the same day as the interview. The quality of the recording was very good and thus the 
transcription was easy to make. Vaahtoranta was clearly an expert when it came to Lyyti’s 
operations in Germany and was very capable in answering all the questions. 
Two days later, on March 23rd 2016, the interview with Hollmén was done also in 
Lyyti’s office. As with Vaahtoranta, the interview had been scheduled via email and the 
interview themes had been sent to Hollmén one week before. This time the interview was 
done in Finnish as this was Hollmén’s native language. The interview was a little shorter 
than the first one and lasted less than one hour. Still, there was enough time to go through 
all the interview themes and Hollmén gave detailed answers to each question. The 
recording was again done with the phone and the quality was very good. The transcription 
was done one day after the interview. 
Similar to the first two interviews, the interview with Juntunen was also scheduled via 
email and the interview themes were sent to him one week in advance. The interview was 
done on April 1st 2016 in Juntunen’s office in Helsinki and lasted approximately 30 
minutes. The chosen language was Juntunen’s native language Finnish. Due to Groupon’s 
strict confidentiality regulations Juntunen was not allowed to comment on all the 
questions. Furthermore, as Juntunen had not participated in the decision making regarding 
the divestment of operations in Finland he did not have all the information concerning the 
case. The decision had come from the highest management level at Groupon’s 
headquarters in Chicago without much further explanation. Nevertheless, Juntunen was 
able to answer most of the questions and make some own conclusions what may have 
been affecting Groupon’s decision to divest from Finland. The interview remained 
relatively short as many of the themes in Benito’s divestment model did not apply to 
Groupon Finland’s case and were therefore not discussed in more detail. In 30 minutes 
Juntunen had shared all the information he could concerning the factors that had 
contributed to Groupon Finland’s divestment. The recording quality of the phone was 
again very good and the transcription was done two days after the interview. 
To complement the data from the interview with Juntunen, public data and statements 
of Groupon were used as another source of information. As Groupon is a large 
multinational company that is listed on the stock exchange there was a fair amount of 
public information available. Sources of information included the company’s own 
website, the company’s blog, as well as news articles on trustworthy websites. 
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At the end of the research process the results and conclusions were sent to the 
participants for inspection. This was particularly asked for from the participants as they 
wanted to verify that the information given by them was interpreted correctly. 
3.3 Data analysis 
According to Merriam (2014), data analysis is the process where the researcher makes 
sense out of the data and finds answers to the research questions. In a multiple case study, 
such as this one, data is analyzed in two stages. The first step is a within-case analysis, 
where each individual case is analyzed separately and treated as a comprehensive case in 
and of itself. This stage is followed by a cross-case analysis, where the cases are compared 
with each other to identify similarities and differences across cases and in contrast to 
theory. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008; Merriam 2014.)  
The chosen approach for this thesis was a deductive content analysis which is based 
on a theoretical framework (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002). Tuomi and Sarajärvi describe three 
main phases of content analysis in qualitative research: (1) reducing the data; (2) 
categorizing the data; and (3) abstraction. Following these instructions, the interviews 
were first transcribed from the recordings and the transcriptions were read and re-read in 
order to create an understanding of the data. Important parts of the interviews were 
underlined and subsequently listed in a separate document. This way unimportant 
information was removed from the data set. A simplified description of the content was 
marked next to the original expressions. 
In the second phase the coded data was evaluated in detail in order to identify to which 
theme of the theoretical framework the expressions belonged to. This was simple because 
the main categories were already predetermined from the theoretical framework and the 
interview questions were grouped according to these categories. The information from 
the three interviews and the public statements was first organized together according to 
the four themes of Benito’s (1997b) framework. After this the information was further 
divided into the respective subcategories of the framework. 
The last phase was about abstraction. In a deductive content analysis, the theoretical 
concepts are already given and the inquirer simply has to connect the empirical data to 
these concepts. In this thesis, the concepts were presented in Benito’s framework of 
foreign divestment. The empirical data was coded open and presented in a categorization 
matrix (Table 2). 
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Table 2  Categorization matrix 
 
 
The categorization matrix has one paragraph for each case, Lyyti and Groupon. The 
findings of the two cases were analyzed individually and categorized based on their 
correspondence with Benito’s four divestment factors: (1) environmental stability; (2) 
attractiveness of current operations; (3) strategic fit; and (4) governance issues. To 
conclude, the findings of the cases were summarized and compared with each other. 
3.4 Evaluation of the study 
The basic concept of trustworthiness is simple: the researcher has to persuade the reader 
that the findings of his or her study are worth taking account of. Traditionally, a research 
has been evaluated based on the following criteria: (1) internal validity; (2) external 
validity; (3) reliability; and (4) objectivity (Merriam 2014). As these criteria have been 
found to be inappropriate for naturalistic research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) have 
proposed and defended four alternative dimensions of a trustworthy study: (1) credibility; 
(2) transferability; (3) dependability; and (4) confirmability. These are the criteria that are 
also used to evaluate the trustworthiness of this research. 
Credibility, alternative for internal validity, refers to how research findings match the 
reality (Merriam 2014). How credible are the findings given the data presented? “Because 
human beings are the primary instrument of data collection and analysis in qualitative 
research, interpretations of reality are accessed directly through their observations and 
interviews” (Merriam 2014, 214). When evaluating the credibility of a research, one must 
ask how familiar the researcher is with the topic and if the data is sufficient to justify the 
claims. Moreover, are the links between observations and categories strong and logical? 
For a research to be credible, any other researcher should be able to come relatively close 
to the same interpretations based on the materials used in the research. (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen 2008.) 
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To increase the credibility of this research, I first familiarized myself with the topic by 
reading numerous academic articles and studies about foreign divestments as well as 
theories related to the topic. Next, I conducted three comprehensive interviews with 
people who had own real life experience about the phenomenon. The interviews were 
recorded so that any other researcher could use the material to conduct the same research 
again. Furthermore, the empirical findings were clearly linked to the theoretical 
framework and the linkages were illustrated in the operationalization chart. At the end of 
the research process the findings and conclusions were sent to the participants for 
inspection. This way they could confirm whether the data from the interviews had been 
interpreted correctly. Moreover, this allowed me to identify my own biases and 
misunderstandings and mistakes could be avoided. Still, one may question whether the 
amount of data was sufficient enough. A higher number of interviews and the usage of 
multiple sources of data and/or multiple inquirers would have made the study more 
credible.  
External validity deals with the question of how generalizable the results of a research 
are. That is, to which extent can the findings of the study be applied to other situations. 
In a qualitative study, findings cannot be generalized in the statistical sense. (Merriam 
2014.) Therefore, Lincoln and Guba (1985, 298) suggest the term ‘transferability’, in 
which “the burden of proof lies less with the original investigator than with the person 
seeking to make an application elsewhere”. Transferability refers to the similarity 
between a given research and any other research. It is not concerned with the replication 
of the research but the inquirer should be able to show to some extent similarities in other 
contexts. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008.) Furthermore, Lincoln and Guba argue that the 
causal relationships found in the research should be transferable to other theoretical 
contexts. This would establish a connection between the research and earlier studies on 
the subject (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008).  
The transferability of this research was increased by linking it strongly to earlier 
academic studies. Moreover, the chosen case companies resembled many other 
companies in the e-business sector regarding their size, customer base, and business 
model. Hence, it can be argued that the results can be applied to other similar companies 
with similar cases of foreign divestments. However, it should be noted that every 
divestment case is unique in its nature. 
Merriam describes reliability as the extent to which research findings can be replicated. 
As the replication of a qualitative study will not yield the same results, the more important 
question when evaluating qualitative research is whether the findings are consistent with 
the data collected. Lincoln and Guba suggest the term ‘dependability’ to describe 
reliability in qualitative studies. Here the idea is that a research with the same or similar 
respondents in a same or similar context would lead to the same findings. By describing 
the interviews accurately, the inquirer can increase the dependability of the research. 
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Eriksson and Kovalainen describe dependability as to how logical, traceable and 
documented the research process has been. The researcher’s responsibility is to offer 
enough information to the reader in order to make the research trustworthy. The research 
process of this study has been described in detail to make it as logical, traceable and 
documented as possible. Furthermore, the interviews have been recorded so that the any 
other researcher could analyze the data again if needed. 
Objectivity is typically judged based on the criterion of intersubjective agreement. 
What a number of individuals experiences is considered objective, and what a single 
individual experiences is subjective. In a qualitative definition of objectivity, the 
emphasis is no longer on the investigator but on the data themselves. The question to be 
asked is now: Are the characteristics of the data confirmable or not? (Lincoln & Guba 
1985.) Confirmability is concerned with linking findings and interpretations to the data 
in a way that can be easily understood by the reader. The inquirer has to show that the 
findings of a research are not just imagination. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008.) Lincoln 
and Guba describe confirmability as the extent to which the findings of a study depend 
on the topic and the conditions of the research, and how dependable they are on the biases, 
motivations, interests, and perspectives of the inquirer. It is the responsibility of the 
researcher to make sure that the findings are grounded in the collected data and that 
conclusions drawn from the data are logical.  
To make this study more confirmable, the research process has been described as 
detailed as possible to the reader. However, certain issues may have affected the 
confirmability of this research. As the interviews were done in another language than 
English, the data had to be translated afterwards and may have caused some decrease in 
confirmability. Furthermore, as the theoretical framework was used as the basis for the 
interview themes, the questions asked in the interview may have been leading and causing 
the participants to answer differently than without any leading questions. It should also 
be noted that information from individuals is always subjective. In order to get a more 
objective picture of the phenomenon, multiple interviews were conducted but perhaps 
there should have been even more interviews to ensure a better confirmability of the 
research. Moreover, the special features of a case study presented certain limitations in 
its usage. Although the desired outcome was a rich and holistic description and analysis 
of the phenomenon, there were limitations regarding the length of this study and the time 
and resources I could devote to it. All the desired information and contacts were not 
available to me. This is partly due to the sensitive nature of the topic, as divestments are 
often considered as failures and companies tend to be unwilling to talk about them. 
Furthermore, as in qualitative case studies the researcher is the primary instrument of data 
collection and analysis, my limited expertise as a researcher may have affected the 
confirmability of this research. 
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4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
4.1 Case Lyyti 
4.1.1 Background 
Lyyti Oy is a Finnish online company offering a web-based software for managing events 
efficiently. Lyyti was founded in 2006 by Hollmén and Peltonen, who had been working 
in the travel and restaurant business for more than ten years and had organized hundreds 
of events during this time. Hollmén and Peltonen got tired of handling tasks manually and 
decided to create a service that would do these tasks for them. The outcome was Lyyti, a 
web-based software that contains all the tools that are needed for managing events 
efficiently: automatic invitations and registrations, online payment services, 
communication, and feedback collection. Furthermore, Lyyti is available as a mobile 
application for Android and iOS devices. (Lyyti 2016.) 
Lyyti is characterized by six distinct features: (1) easy to use; (2) web-based; (3) 
available 24h; (4) inexpensive; (5) efficient; and (6) personal. By making event 
management more efficient Lyyti is able to save valuable working time of event 
managers. Lyyti is a software that is provided as a licensed service model with a monthly 
fee. Firms can choose between different pricing plans including various features 
depending on the chosen model. 
The customer base of Lyyti Oy varies from small companies to large, multinational 
corporations, public organizations, and government bodies. The service is used for a wide 
range of different events, such as internal trainings and meetings as well as seminars, 
conferences, and customer events. Lyyti is a scalable and flexible service that can be 
tailored to suit all kinds of event management needs. Every year Lyyti is used at more 
than 40,000 events, mainly B2B events. 
The headquarters of the company is located in Turku (Finland), but Lyyti also has 
employees in Helsinki (Finland) and Stockholm (Sweden). The total number of 
employees is at the moment 25, soon to be 27. Two of them are working in Sweden. Lyyti 
Oy aims to become market leader in event management in Europe. Today Lyyti has 
around 600–700 companies as customers. About 500 of them are license customers who 
are actively using Lyyti and the rest is customers that are only using Lyyti for one or two 
events per year. (Hollmén, interview 23.3.2016.) 
Lyyti’s strategy was from the beginning on to become an international company. Due 
to the small size of the Finnish market it was clear that if Lyyti wants to expand it can 
only be done internationally.  
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“We knew that this is a niche product and the market is not endless in 
Finland. And we thought that if we have a solution that is working in one 
country it can be easily exported to other countries.” (Hollmén, interview 
23.3.2016.) 
 
The management was aware that the internationalization had to be started somewhere. 
Lyyti had internal German language resources, and Germany was seen as a country where 
Finnish technology know-how was traditionally appreciated and quality was valued. 
Furthermore, the idea was that the German market is large and not so unfamiliar. Lyyti 
already had some ties to Germany through existing customers who had subsidiaries or 
customers there. These were hoped to help in the internationalization of the service. Lyyti 
did not want to take the risk of opening a subsidiary in Germany and decided that it would 
be best to enter the market through a local partner. 
In 2013 Lyyti Oy entered the German market with its web-based Software-as-a-
Service (SaaS) solution (Grohmann 2013). Before entering the market Lyyti had done 
some market research but the knowledge that was acquired was still very superficial. At 
the same time the management had been trying to find companies that would take over 
the distribution and sales of the service for them in Germany. A Finnish consulting agency 
with a German manager was hired to find a retailer but without success. There seemed to 
be no such company that could have taken Lyyti in their product portfolio and start selling 
the service through their own channels and networks in Germany. As Hollmén stated, 
Lyyti went through many different stages before the business in Germany started. 
 
“First we were trying to find a retailer [in Germany] and that took some 
time. Later we came to the conclusion that there is no suitable retailer. We 
tried out some things by ourselves but then we realized that we need a local 
salesperson. --- We understood that selling the service from Turku to 
Germany is not a working concept. So we started looking for a company 
that would do the sales for us.” (Hollmén, interview 23.3.2016.) 
 
In 2013 Lyyti found a suitable company in Berlin that was specialized in the 
distribution of SaaS solutions as well as in helping foreign start-ups to sell their products 
in Germany. The company sounded promising as the manager had already earlier sales 
experience in both large and small companies. Lyyti’s management believed that this 
partner would have an understanding of the German culture, of B2B sales in Germany, 
as well as certain limitations of a start-up. Lyyti did not have an endless amount of money 
and expected the activities in Germany to be financed through the revenue from sales.  
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The collaboration started out well and two employees were recruited to work for Lyyti. 
However, one of the employees turned out not to be the right person to sell the service 
and thus Lyyti continued with only one full time employee in Germany. She was very 
motivated and hardworking, and did everything Lyyti thought that should be done in order 
to sell the service.  
Lyyti was trying to duplicate the same sales strategy that had been found to be 
successful in Finland: cold calling all potential customers and arranging meetings with 
them. As it turned out this strategy was not working at all. Hollmén stated that challenges 
were there since the beginning of the German operations. It became clear that even though 
there was interest towards the service the decision making processes were extremely long 
in Germany. Thus, the sales process in total was long. This was different to Finland where 
the salespeople get an answer much faster. Even at the assistant level employees are able 
to tell if there is interest towards the product and if someone can come to introduce it 
personally. In Germany, however, there were a lot of gatekeepers. Assistants were not 
able to tell anything because the decisions were made at the management level, but 
managers were very hard to reach or make appointments with. 
 
“Often they [the managers] asked us to send an info mail where we would 
tell about the company and the product and our references etc. Then they 
would consider it in the management group or somewhere, but only three 
months later. And after this we could get back to it and ask if they were 
interested in a meeting. In other words, the sales process became very 
long.” (Hollmén, interview 23.3.2016.) 
 
As the partner company began to grow the manager did not have time anymore to 
focus on Lyyti and its German employee. The help from the manager was constantly 
getting weaker until Lyyti reached the point that it had to cut the working hours of the 
sales manager. Hollmén argues that it was pointless to pay a full monthly salary to the 
German employee because the sales strategy simply was not working. Even with the help 
of a new contact person in Germany, who had managed sales of another large online 
company, the results did not get better. 
Even though Lyyti did finally win some good customers in Germany the business was 
still not financially profitable. With Lyyti’s pricing model it was not profitable to use six 
months in the sales process. As the number of potential customers was so small to begin 
with, the outcome could not have been positive no matter how hard Lyyti tried. 
In the end the German employee was only responsible for managing new contact 
requests but not making any outward calls anymore. Lyyti had been considering the 
option to divest operations from Germany for quite some time until the final decision was 
made in spring 2015. Vaahtoranta got the last email from the German sales manager in 
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May 2015. This was the end of the partnership with the German company as well as 
Lyyti’s active operations in Germany. Later on the German sales manager changed to 
another company and was thus not responsible for new contact requests either. 
After Lyyti had ceased the most expensive part of its German operations it still 
continued with some small marketing activities. The few leads that now come from 
Lyyti’s content marketing are managed by Vaahtoranta, centralized from the office in 
Turku. After the collaboration with the German partner had ended Lyyti has been able to 
get almost as many new customers as with active sales activities. As Lyyti is not investing 
money in Germany anymore the business is now much more profitable. 
 
“Now we are only trying to pick the so called ‘low hanging fruits’, i.e. the 
customers that are truly interested in us and contact us. They are clearly 
the ones that are already willing to make a change and are looking for a 
solution. It is easier to sell to them.” (Hollmén, interview 23.3.2016.) 
 
Lyyti’s software is now sold online to Germany and not via phone calls and meetings. 
The training can also be done online. Lyyti has not turned down the German market but 
the right operating model still has to be found. Having a local sales manager with an 
expensive monthly salary simply was not profitable for Lyyti. In addition to online sales, 
Hollmén implied that having an own company in Germany selling the service is still an 
option. Lyyti continues on the path of internationalization and is still actively investing 
in becoming international, but Sweden is now the country where Lyyti is really 
established in and where it has its own employees. 
4.1.2 Empirical findings 
Environmental stability: Lyyti is operating in the software industry which is generally 
a very R&D intensive industry. Lyyti itself is investing a lot in R&D. The company has 
a R&D team of five, soon to be six people, and approximately one third of the company’s 
expenses are going in R&D. 
When it comes to competition, the market in Germany is divided in two. There is 
simultaneously a well-developed market with a few large companies that have been 
already many years on the market. On the other hand, there are companies that are still 
very old fashioned and far behind of development. There were two large competitors in 
Germany and multiple smaller companies in the same business as Lyyti. However, the 
competitors often had tools that were not very flexible and did not offer a completely 
web-based solution. Their focus was somewhat different than Lyyti’s. As Hollmén states, 
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Lyyti did not lose against other competitors but they did not even make it to the point of 
a sales meeting. 
As for country risks, Vaahtoranta argues that inside of the European Union this factor 
can be left out when considering determinants of foreign divestment decisions. Lyyti did 
not face any problems in Germany’s political environment and the interviewees did not 
feel that there would have been any country risks affecting their business. The time that 
Lyyti was active in Germany was too short to notice any changes in the environment. The 
only concern regarding the political environment in a larger sense was the financial office 
in Germany. Because of the bureaucracy Lyyti was not able to offer all the online payment 
methods it would have wanted to in Germany. In order to be more flexible when it comes 
to payments, Lyyti would have had to have a branch in Germany as well as a German 
bank account. 
Attractiveness of current operations: When Lyyti entered Germany the goals were 
more so called learning goals. Lyyti wanted to learn how to be successful in the German 
market and accepted that this would also include learning from mistakes. A meeting 
where a customer would not buy the service but would give a good explanation why they 
did not want it, would at this stage have been almost as valuable as a sale. However, Lyyti 
was hoping to at least break even with its investments to Germany, i.e. earn as much as 
they were spending for the service. Even though Lyyti’s financial goals were very modest, 
these goals were not met during the time that Lyyti was active in Germany. 
 
“We thought that we would have a faster cash flow from there [Germany] 
but we ended up spending our own money and getting nothing in return. 
We started pretty soon getting second thoughts if this was making any 
sense.” (Hollmén, interview 23.3.2016.) 
 
Lyyti’s German unit was performing very poorly and the operations were financially 
not profitable at all. Hollmén wondered if with more resources and some external 
investors Lyyti would have succeeded better.  
 
“We probably would have done the same in the beginning but with a 
greater volume and would have spent the money faster. On the other hand, 
we would have had the strength to continue longer, and this was required 
in the sales process [in Germany]. This could have maybe worked.” 
(Hollmén, interview 23.3.2016.) 
 
The German economy was growing but this did not have any impact on Lyyti’s 
business. As Vaahtoranta notes, for the economy to have an impact on the business the 
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company would have to be quite large. Lyyti was just a very small firm on the German 
market and thus it was completely insignificant if the economy was growing or not. 
The growth opportunities in both Sweden as well as in Lyyti’s home country Finland 
seemed better than in Germany. Lyyti had entered the Swedish market approximately at 
the same time as the German market. Even though Sweden was in the beginning a tough 
market for Lyyti as well, the business was going better there as in Germany. This was 
supporting the decision to divest operations in Germany and rather reallocate resources 
on marketing in Sweden. 
For Lyyti’s customers it is important to be able to manage their financial transactions 
through Lyyti’s software but this turned out to be challenging in Germany. The financial 
services provided in Germany were different than in Finland and for example the use of 
online banks was not very common. In Germany customers were used to other payment 
methods that Lyyti was not able to provide. The investments in product development 
concerning financial transactions remained small because it did not feel like it would have 
made a difference when it came to winning new customers. 
Before entering the German market Lyyti had an intern who did some market research, 
but as Vaahtoranta stated, this research was not systematic and the knowledge that was 
acquired was still very superficial. When Lyyti entered the German market it was hoping 
to enter an existing system where the distribution and sales would already work and Lyyti 
would simply be a new product in the portfolio. This turned out to be not the case.  
 
“All in all, it [the failure] had to do with the fact that Lyyti did not know 
the market well enough and the sales and distribution model was wrong.” 
(Vaahtoranta, interview 21.3.2016.) 
 
This lack of knowledge and misjudgment of the German system can be summarized to be 
a consequence of insufficient pre-investment analysis. 
Foreignness was another factor complicating Lyyti’s German activities. As mentioned 
before, Lyyti was trying to duplicate its Finnish sales and distribution model in Germany 
and this did not work. Vaahtoranta explained that in Finland this model was working 
because Lyyti was already established on the Finnish market. It was a well-known 
company in Finland and had already existing contacts there. Moreover, as Lyyti was a 
local service it may have felt more trustworthy to Finnish customers. In Germany, 
however, Lyyti was a small and foreign company that was new in the country and nobody 
had heard about it before.  
Vaahtoranta further pointed out that the distribution and sales of Software-as-a-Service 
solutions has changed a lot in recent years. Cold calling and meeting customers does not 
work anymore, and the focus is now more on content marketing. When a customer starts 
looking for a software they will first examine which company looks professional and has 
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for example good references. For this, the company has to be first established on the 
market. In Lyyti’s case it did not matter that it was market leader in Finland, as it was still 
too unknown in Germany. This was the reason that the same business strategy as in 
Finland did not work at all in Germany. Lyyti learned that before entering a foreign 
market you have to first find the right contacts there. 
Strategic fit: The path towards becoming international started with operations in 
Germany and Sweden. However, in Germany Lyyti had to realize that the sales and 
distribution model would have to look completely different in order to succeed. Using an 
external company to sell Lyyti was not working, especially since the management of the 
partner company did not seem to be committed to the business. During the time that Lyyti 
was active in Germany Vaahtoranta did not realize immediately that changes in strategy 
were needed. Lyyti was always just changing small details instead of setting up the 
complete system new. This would have been necessary for Lyyti to meet the strategic 
goals. 
When entering Germany, the product had to be localized and some changes regarding 
for example the language and payment methods were made. As the changes remained 
small Vaahtoranta states that the factor of strategic relatedness does not fit the case. 
However, the lack of diversification may have actually harmed Lyyti’s operations in 
Germany. A point that came up in the interview was that Lyyti was reluctant to make 
extensive changes in the beginning of its international expansion. Since Lyyti was 
successful in Finland with its original strategy the management did not think they would 
need to change the strategy when going to Germany. Some things that Vaahtoranta sees 
nowadays as self-evident for many born global companies, he thought would be 
unnecessary in Lyyti’s case. This included for example a free trial period of the service 
before buying it. Furthermore, Hollmén noted that if Lyyti would have decided to 
continue active operations in Germany the payment methods should have been developed 
further and localized to German preferences. Also, the communication was an issue in 
the German software version as it was not formal enough for the German culture. Hollmén 
believes that small things have an impact and that limitations in the service may have 
harmed the business. 
Governance issues: Vaahtoranta gave his admittedly very biased opinion about how 
the mentality in Berlin specifically may have had an influence on why Lyyti was not 
succeeding in Germany. Lyyti’s partner was trying to win customers all over Germany 
but was doing this centralized from Berlin. Vaahtoranta thought at first that the event 
business would be very large in Berlin, but he soon realized that even if this was true, 
nobody in Berlin wants to spend money in the event industry. This may have been another 
case if the partner would have worked centralized from another city. All in all, the 
business culture was very different which is why the strategy that Lyyti used in Germany 
was completely wrong. 
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The hierarchy is much higher in Germany compared to Finland and the culture is very 
formal. The sales strategy in Finland was to directly meet the final user of the service who 
was often a secretary or an assistant. They would then forward the information within the 
company and recommend the manager to buy the service. In Germany, however, this was 
not working. The assistants made it clear that they were not the ones making any decisions 
and if Lyyti wanted to sell its product they would have to schedule a meeting with the 
management. This in turn was very difficult. 
Lyyti was struggling with the issue of how to go around the slow decision making 
processes of customers in Germany. The problem in Germany was that people cannot 
make decisions. Furthermore, they are not willing to take even the smallest risk and go 
out of their comfort zone. Vaahtoranta thinks that in Finland people are much more 
spontaneous when it comes to trying out new services. Hollmén supported this by telling 
how in Germany people are often stuck with old operating models. 
 
“I guess that the price was not the issue why the sales process was so long 
but it was the culture. It is a very inflexible culture where new things 
change slowly. For some parts it was surprising that the operating models 
are still very old fashioned in some aspects. For example, fax registration 
is completely acceptable, and sometimes even required. So there were 
some issues related to how willing people were to use new technologies 
and operating models.” (Hollmén, interview 23.3.2016.) 
 
Lyyti’s operation mode in Germany was using a local sales company. The relationship 
to the employee of the German partner company was very good. Vaahtoranta was almost 
in daily contact with the sales manager in Berlin and there were no problems with her. 
However, the management of the partner company was disappointing. Vaahtoranta felt 
like they did not really care if Lyyti was doing business or not. The service was bad and 
the management did not show any initiative to improve it. The management never gave 
an explanation for this but Vaahtoranta suspects that Lyyti may have been too small of a 
customer for them. Vaahtoranta and Hollmén were very unsatisfied with the situation. 
When asked why they did not change the partner, Vaahtoranta answered that there were 
very few other firms that would offer the service Lyyti needed in Germany. Moreover, 
the fact that Lyyti had already invested so much time in that partner and had trained the 
employee in Germany, made it difficult for Lyyti to change. Vaahtoranta admits that Lyyti 
was trying for too long with the same strategy. In retrospect he sees that Lyyti should 
have continued the first strategy only for a couple of months and if it did not work out, 
try out something new. 
Lyyti did not have much earlier international experience before expanding to 
Germany. There were some customers abroad who had been acquired through existing 
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Finnish customers. Thus, Lyyti did have some experience in serving foreign customers 
but it had not done any active sales activities outside of Finland.  
The lack of international experience was surely linked to the decision to divest, but in 
Lyyti’s case this was a greater issue. This did not only have to do with the fact that Lyyti 
did not know how to sell the service in another country, but the complete strategy of the 
company had to develop first. Since Germany Lyyti has learned a lot and the strategy is 
constantly being developed further. Vaahtoranta pointed out that these things cannot be 
considered separately, but everything is linked to everything in a small firm such as Lyyti. 
4.2 Case Groupon 
4.2.1 Background 
Groupon operates online local commerce marketplaces worldwide that connect 
merchants to consumers by offering goods and services at a discounted price. The mission 
statement is “to connect local commerce, increasing consumer buying power while 
driving more business to local merchants through price and discovery”. Groupon is 
available both online and as a mobile application. (Groupon Press 2016.) 
Groupon has redefined how companies attract, retain and interact with customers. The 
firm provides merchants a selection of products and services, including customizable deal 
campaigns that help firms to grow and operate more effectively. The goal is to connect 
local trade with an increase in consumer purchasing power, which will lead to increased 
sales of local distributors. Groupon’s business model is to charge a marketing fee for 
advertising and promoting the merchants’ offers. In most cases, that fee is a percentage 
of the revenue that the merchant has generated by selling on Groupon. (Groupon Works 
2016.) 
Groupon offers deals in three main categories. Groupon Featured Deals are meant to 
reach out for customers and boost brand awareness of local and national merchants. 
Groupon Getaways features travel offers, including hotels, airfare and package deals. 
Groupon Shopping refers to deals across multiple product lines, such as electronics, 
jewelry, or toys. 
Groupon was founded in 2008 by Mason, Lefkofsky and Keywell (CNN Money 2016). 
After the first deal, other firms caught on quickly and Groupon started running deals for 
increasingly larger businesses. By the end of 2009 Groupon had spread to 28 U.S. cities. 
The following spring Groupon began its international expansion. Today Groupon 
operates through three geographical segments: North America representing the U.S. and 
Canada, EMEA consisting of Europe, the Middle East and Africa, as well as international 
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operations comprising the rest of the world. (Groupon Works 2016.) Europe is further 
divided in four segments that each have their own headquarters. Finland belonged to the 
Northern Europe segment that had its headquarters in London. (Juntunen, interview 
1.4.2016.) 
Europe was Groupon’s first international market outside of the U.S. (Ecommerce 
News 2015). The business started successfully after acquiring CityDeal from Rocket 
Internet Group in 2010 (Williams 2015b). Rocket Internet had brought Groupon’s 
business idea to Europe and was at the time of the acquisition already operating in 16 
European countries under the brand CityDeal, including Finland. CityDeal came to 
Finland in the beginning of 2010 and opened officially in May 2010. The business in 
Finland started out very strong and the growth was fast. The whole industry Groupon was 
operating in was completely new back then and very hyped and popular at the time. It 
was somewhat challenging to control the extremely fast growth of the company in 
Finland. Technology had to be developed simultaneously as the company was growing 
and in a new industry it was hard to predict what issues would come up next. The service 
was constantly being developed in the right direction based on the wishes of consumers 
and business partners. Groupon invested a lot of time in controlling the satisfaction of 
consumers and partners. In the beginning the technology was not as developed as what it 
should have been but this was normal as the industry was still so new. (Juntunen, 
interview 1.4.2016.) 
Groupon has 570,000 active deals and more than 3.5 million Groupon Pages. The 
customer base counts for 48.6 million active customers. (Groupon Works 2016) Despite 
the growing business in North America, high competition in local markets abroad has led 
to a decline in Groupon’s international business. In the third quarter of 2015 Groupon 
reported billings of $414 million and revenues of $199 million for EMEA, reflecting a 
respective decline of 15% and 13%. (Lunden 2015.) 
News have reported about several closures in Groupon’s international business. In 
September 2015 Groupon laid off 1,100 employees and divested operations in Morocco, 
Panama, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, Thailand, and Uruguay. Before that, 
operations were shut down in Greece and Turkey and the controlling stakes in Groupon 
India and TicketMonster were sold off. (Lunden 2015.) 
In November 2015 it was announced that Groupon would cease operations in four 
more countries: Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. A spokesperson confirmed in 
an emailed statement: “After careful consideration Groupon will discontinue its 
operations in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland as of 16 November 2015.” (see 
Lunden 2015.) Juntunen got the notification from Groupon’s headquarters in Chicago. 
The decision came from the highest management level without further explanations. After 
this the operations in Finland were closed down. 
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4.2.2 Empirical findings 
Environmental stability: Groupon invested a lot in R&D in different areas in order to 
improve the service. The service was constantly being developed to serve customers and 
business partners better. The industry that Groupon was operating in was very R&D 
intensive in general. However, the competition in Finland was not strong. As Groupon 
held a market share of nearly 90% in Finland, it was a very tough business field for 
competitors. Even though some competitors did show up, they all had to quit finally. 
Groupon was dominating the field with much greater resources. The service was 
constantly being improved in the U.S. headquarters and was thus developing faster than 
the competitors. Moreover, Groupon Finland had more people working for them and 
could therefore serve more partners and more customers. All of the competitors in Finland 
had been local firms and not international companies like Groupon. Thus, their resources 
had been small in comparison. 
Country risks had not had an impact on Groupon’s operations in Finland. There had 
been no governmental actions or other changes in the business environment that would 
have affected the business. 
Attractiveness of current operations: Groupon Finland had the advantage of being 
the only large company in its industry in Finland. All the other companies that tried to 
challenge Groupon in Finland failed, and finally Groupon was the only one left on the 
market. However, as for any company in the IT industry the number of potential 
customers in Finland was small. The market in Finland was merely one tenth compared 
to Groupon’s other markets such as France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. This was a clear 
disadvantage for Finland as Juntunen points out that in larger countries a company can 
achieve stronger growth. 
 
“This surely was the most significant reason [for divestment of Groupon 
Finland]. When the return on investment is higher in some countries, surely 
all global companies will focus on those.” (Juntunen, interview 1.4.2016.) 
 
In November 2015 Groupon’s new CEO Williams wrote in the company’s blog that 
Groupon would further simplify and streamline its business, in particular its international 
segments. This included focusing on countries where Groupon could identify better 
growth opportunities. 
 
“This means moving to more shared services for economies of scale, and 
it means better picking our battles – exiting or partnering in countries 
where we don’t believe we can win or where winning will require more 
time, technology and investment than we should manage. And, in some 
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markets where we’re seeing results — Australia, France, Germany, Italy 
and UK, to name a few — it means increasing our investment to better 
capitalize on the opportunity.” (Williams 2015c.) 
 
Juntunen was not allowed to comment on Groupon Finland’s financial performance. 
However, as the value of Groupon’s share had dropped 90% over the last years it was 
clear that something radical had to be done to get the business growing again. Williams 
(2015a) stated in a blog post on the company’s website that it was not profitable for 
Groupon to bring its technology, tools, and marketplace to every one of its 40+ countries. 
The investment simply did not commensurate with the return. 
 
“We believe that in order for our geographic footprint to be an even bigger 
advantage, we need to focus our energy and dollars on fewer countries. 
So, we decided to exit a number of countries where the required investment 
and market potential don’t align.” (Williams 2015a.) 
 
From the interview with Juntunen and the public statements it became evident that one 
of the main reasons that had led to Groupon Finland’s divestment was the parent 
company’s weak overall performance. When Groupon first was listed on the stock market 
its value was very high. However, over the last five years 90% of the stock value had 
dropped (Figure 12). 
Figure 12 Stock value development of Groupon Inc (NASDAQ:GRPN) 
 
Source: Google Finance (2016). 
The stock value reached its peak in November 2011 when the trading price was $ 26.19 
per share. In February 2016 the stock had dropped to its all-time bottom with a trading 
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price of only $ 2.45. The negative trend had been visible already since 2012, even though 
there had been some signs of recovery. However, when the stock started sinking again in 
2015 Groupon’s management decided to draw some radical measures. 
Strategic fit: After Groupon’s value on the stock market started falling significantly, 
some changes in the strategy had to be made. A broad downsizing and restructuring 
strategy was hoped to lead to recovery (Williams 2015b). According to an emailed 
statement of a spokesman, Groupon would cease its international assets that did not 
comply with its vision: 
 
“As we continue our operational and strategic focus to simplify and 
streamline our international business, we are assessing our international 
portfolio to determine which assets can contribute to our long-term vision 
of aggressive, profitable growth." (see Lunden 2015.) 
 
Furthermore, Williams (2015a) wrote in the company’s blog that Groupon was now in 
a position to realize the efficiencies they had been working so hard to gain, to further 
improve the way Groupon operates around the world and to continue channel more and 
more of their resources toward long-term growth. 
Governance issues: Groupon Finland was directly reporting to the headquarters of the 
Northern Europe segment in London. Juntunen’s relationship with the management in 
London was good. There were no issues caused by cultural distance between Finland and 
the UK. Due to the nature of Groupon’s business, Groupon Finland was cooperating with 
several partners and marketing companies. However, as all of Groupon Finland’s local 
business partners were managed through local employees there were no cultural issues in 
this sense either. Everything was handled within Finland. 
Juntunen did not have much earlier international experience when he started as the 
country manager for Groupon Finland. At the time that Groupon started in Finland the 
headquarters did not have much international experience either. The international 
expansion had only started in Europe. However, five years later when Groupon Finland 
was divested the company had already acquired plenty of international experience having 
operations in 40+ different countries. 
Groupon was trying to adapt its business to each country’s culture as well as possible. 
Due to cultural differences there had to be some small changes, but all in all Groupon was 
operating in a similar way in all of its countries. Finland was here no exception, i.e. 
Groupon Finland was not differentiating much from the headquarters. 
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4.3 A summary of the main empirical findings 
The empirical part of this thesis has focused on examining the foreign divestments of the 
two chosen case companies, Lyyti and Groupon. In Lyyti’s case the divestment from 
Germany was examined and in Groupon’s case the divestment from Finland. The 
empirical findings were obtained by conducting three interviews and in Groupon’s case 
complementing the interview with public data and statements. The interviews were done 
with experts from both companies who had been in a key role in the divested operations. 
Following the theoretical framework of this thesis, the interview themes were based on 
the four factors of Benito’s divestment model, presented in Chapter 2. Barriers and 
incentives to exit were not considered in this thesis as they were not perceived to have 
any explanatory value when examining the drivers of foreign divestment. Table 3 
provides an overview of the main empirical findings regarding what was the role of the 
different factors in Lyyti’s and Groupon’s foreign divestment cases. 




As seen in Table 3, the interviewees in Lyyti’s case were able to identify issues related 
to each of these themes. In Groupon’s case the findings were limited to the factors 
‘Attractiveness of current operations’ and ‘Strategic fit’. ‘Environmental stability’ and 
‘Governance issues’ were not found to have any impact on Groupon Finland’s 
divestment. 
Figure 13 demonstrates how Benito’s (1997b) framework could be modified based on 
the combined empirical findings of this thesis. While some of the factors of the original 
framework proved to be valid in this research, other factors were found to be not relevant. 
Furthermore, new factors that were not mentioned in Benito’s framework were found to 
have influenced the exit decision of the studied cases. 
Figure 13 Benito’s framework on divestment of foreign operations (1997b) 
complemented with the empirical findings of this research 
 
Note: Factors that were not found to be relevant in the context of this research are marked 
in brackets and additional empirical observations are marked in italics. 
 
In both Lyyti’s and Groupon’s case some of the factors had clearly a more dominant 
role in the divestment decision while others had a less significant impact. In Lyyti’s case 
the most dominant factors that contributed to the divestment decision were: (1) financial 
considerations; (2) wrong sales and distribution strategy; and (3) cultural differences. The 
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decision to divest from Germany was above all made due to challenges in selling the 
service and creating sufficient cash flow to finance the foreign operations. This could be 
followed back to a wrong sales and distribution strategy that had been duplicated from 
the Finnish strategy and was clearly not working as well in Germany. Differences in the 
business culture such as long decision making processes and high hierarchy made the 
sales process so long that it did not commensurate the investment anymore.  
In addition, there were also smaller issues that were found to have had an impact on 
the decision to divest. The strong bureaucracy in Germany was complicating the 
localization of the software, and both the product as well as the strategy should have been 
adapted better to the German market. Furthermore, the management of the local partner 
company was not committed to Lyyti’s operations in Germany and did not show any 
initiative to improve the strategy when the business was not running well. Another factor 
was that Lyyti’s management did not have much earlier international experience and had 
not made a sufficient pre-investment analysis of the German market before entering it. 
This led to unexpected challenges which were strengthened by the fact that Lyyti was a 
small and foreign company that was still very unknown in Germany. Without the right 
contacts Lyyti was relatively alone on the market and finally came to the conclusion that 
it would be easier to focus on the international expansion in the neighboring country. 
There were better growth opportunities in Sweden as the business was going better, and 
thus the reallocation of resources appealed tempting. 
For Groupon the triggering divestment factor was undoubtedly the weak overall 
performance of the parent company. The stock value had been falling significantly over 
the last five years, and in 2015 the trading price of a share was only ten per cent of what 
it used to be when Groupon was listed. Something radical had to be done and the 
management decided to start a broad downsizing and restructuring strategy hoping that 
the company would recover again. The change in strategy led to a reevaluation of 
Groupon’s international markets and to the divestiture of operations that were not seen to 
support the vision of long-term growth. Resources were reallocated to countries with 
better future prospects and higher return of investment. As the market in Finland was very 
small, it was among the many other countries that Groupon divested from in the end of 
2015. Environmental stability as well as governance issues were not considered 
influential regarding the divestment decision. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the factors leading to foreign divestments in case 
Lyyti and case Groupon Finland were very different from each other but there were some 
similarities as well. In both cases environmental factors did not contribute significantly 
to the decision to divest, even though in Lyyti’s case the strong bureaucracy in Germany 
did cause some challenges. 
As part of a large multinational company with substantial resources, Groupon Finland 
was able to establish itself on the Finnish market and quickly become market leader with 
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a 90 per cent share of the market. Lyyti, on the other hand, was not known on the German 
market and had difficulties to establish itself there without good references and enough 
resources. In Lyyti’s case it was the weak performance of the German operations that 
made the Swedish market appear more promising, whereas in case Groupon Finland it 
was the small size of the Finnish market that motivated the management to reallocate their 
resources elsewhere. 
Regarding strategic considerations, Lyyti and Groupon Finland differed again 
completely from each other. For Lyyti the international strategy was still under 
development and when expanding to Germany, the chosen strategy turned out to be a 
failure. For Groupon Finland choosing the right strategy was not an issue as it was part 
of a large multinational company with clear directions on how to operate. In this case, 
however, the headquarters’ change of strategy led to the divestiture of the unit. 
According to the empirical findings, governance issues did not contribute to Groupon 
Finland’s divestment but had an impact on Lyyti’s decision to exit the German market. 
Groupon Finland did not face problems related to cultural differences, lack of 
international experience, or issues concerning its mode of operation. All these factors did 
however contribute to Lyyti’s decision to divest its activities from Germany. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Theoretical contributions 
Benito’s (1997b) theoretical model on divestment decisions was found to be accurate in 
both divestment cases studied in this thesis. In Lyyti’s case there was evidence found for 
all the main factors of the framework, and in Groupon’s case the findings were related to 
the factors ‘Attractiveness of current operations’ and ‘Strategic fit’. Even though not all 
the findings of the two cases were directly discussed in Benito’s framework, they still 
clearly fell under the four groups of the divestment model. 
Environmental stability was found to be a minor factor explaining foreign divestment 
decisions in the e-business sector. Benito (1997b) suggests that environmental stability is 
often connected with the R&D intensity of the industry the company is operating in. He 
argues that R&D intensive industries often constitute competitive environments as other 
companies in the industry are also investing heavily in R&D. However, this notion did 
not find support in the empirical findings of this thesis. Even though both case companies 
were operating in a R&D intensive industry, it did not increase the competitiveness of the 
business environment in a way that would have affected the business.  
As both divestments took place in countries inside of the European Union it can be 
argued that the political environment was relatively stable and that country risks were 
minor. In Lyyti’s case there were some issues related to the strong bureaucracy in 
Germany, whereas in case Groupon Finland environmental factors were not found to have 
any effect. The small impact of country risks can be interpreted as being a consequence 
of the chosen cases. If another case had been chosen where the divestment would have 
taken place in a more turbulent and unstable environment, country risks may have been 
found to have a much stronger impact. 
Earlier academic studies have found that attractiveness of current operations can 
significantly contribute to a firm’s foreign divestment decision (see e.g. Boddewyn & 
Business International 1976; Sachdev 1976; Boddewyn 1979; Benito 1997b; Jagersma & 
van Gorp 2003; Song 2014a; Sousa & Tan 2015). Case Lyyti demonstrated that 
challenges in meeting financial goals and unsatisfactory economic performance of foreign 
operations can be a dominant cause leading to foreign divestment. On the other hand, case 
Groupon Finland did not support the notion of financial considerations. This may be 
explained by the limited information that was available due to Groupon’s strict 
confidentiality policy. However, attractiveness of current operations did have an impact 
on case Groupon Finland as well. Supporting the findings of Godar (1997), Benito 
(1997b), and Jagersma and van Gorp (2003), both Groupon and Lyyti had identified better 
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growth opportunities in other markets which made the current markets seem less 
attractive. 
In Lyyti’s case poor pre-investment analysis and foreignness of the company were also 
found to contribute to the decision to divest from Germany. Even though not being 
discussed in Benito’s (1997b) framework, these two issues could still be classified under 
the factor ‘Attractiveness of current operations’. Boddewyn (1979) and Jagersma and van 
Gorp (2003) have reported in their studies that poor preparation is a common factor 
leading to bad financial performance of foreign operations. Furthermore, Jagersma and 
van Gorp (2003) have argued that financial performance may be affected by difficulties 
in building up sales internationally. Foreignness was found to be a major cause why Lyyti 
did not succeed in selling its software in Germany. As a small and unknown company 
without sufficient references Lyyti was not able to establish itself on the market and this 
finally contributed to the decision to divest. 
The findings of case Groupon Finland support the results of earlier academic studies 
that have found that weak performance of the parent company increases the risk of foreign 
divestment (Hryckiewicz & Kowalewski 2010; Hryckiewicz & Kowalewski 2011). The 
weak overall performance of Groupon Finland’s parent company affected the 
attractiveness of its current operations and was therefore a dominant factor contributing 
to the divestment of operations in Finland. 
Supporting earlier academic studies on the subject, the findings of this thesis indicate 
that strategic considerations were a significant factor explaining foreign divestment 
decisions (see e.g. Boddewyn & Torneden 1974; Boddewyn & Business International 
1976; Godar 1997; Benito 1997b; Jagersma & van Gorp 2003; Sousa & Tan 2015). Benito 
(1997b) and Jagersma and van Gorp (2003) have noted that a change in strategy may 
cause previously interesting foreign operations seem less attractive and lead to 
divestment. Moreover, Sousa and Tan (2015) have found that foreign divestment is likely 
to occur when a foreign unit ceases to fit the parent company’s overall strategy. This kind 
of strategic change occurred also in case Groupon Finland. A broad downsizing and 
restructuring strategy was implemented where units with less potential were closed down. 
Groupon had decided to streamline its business and focus its resources on fewer countries. 
In addition to a change in strategy, Boddewyn and Torneden (1974) have found that 
divestments can also be caused by a lack of clear international strategy. This statement 
found support in Lyyti’s case where the international strategy was still under development 
and a simple duplication of the home country strategy did not work in the foreign market.  
Benito argues in his framework that foreign units are divested because of their 
unrelatedness to their parent company. This remark did not find any evidence in this study 
as in both cases the divested units had not diversified considerably from their parent 
company. In case Lyyti the result was contradictory to Benito’s theory. The foreign 
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operations had faced challenges because they had been too related to the home country 
operations. 
The empirical findings of this thesis related to the effect of cultural distance on foreign 
divestments support earlier studies on the subject. Barkema et al. (1996), Pattnaik and 
Lee (2014) and Sousa and Tan (2015) found that cultural differences between the home 
and host country are connected with foreign divestments. In Lyyti’s case one of the factors 
contributing to the company’s divestment decision were the differences in the foreign 
country’s business culture and the customers’ behavior that made sales and distribution 
of the service challenging. 
Benito (1997b) further continues that foreign divestments may be caused by problems 
associated with a company’s operation mode in a foreign country. The findings of this 
thesis support this notion as in Lyyti’s case the operation mode turned out to be not 
successful and problems with the foreign partner had an impact on the company’s 
divestment decision. However, contrary to earlier literature that has suggested that 
divestment may be driven by uncommitted managers in the home country (see e.g. 
Boddewyn 1983a; Alexander & Quinn 2002), Lyyti’s case indicated that the lack of 
managerial commitment derived from the partner’s side. 
Li (1995), Barkema et al. (1996), Leung et al. (2008) and Sousa and Tan (2015) have 
noticed that firms can benefit from earlier international experience in their foreign 
operations. Respectively, firms with less experience are more likely to divest from a 
foreign market. The findings of this thesis support these statements as the lack of earlier 
international experience was found to have an impact on Lyyti’s divestment from 
Germany. 
The findings of this thesis have proved that even within the same industry the factors 
contributing to foreign divestment are not always the same. Moreover, the importance of 
the given factors was found to vary greatly. The results indicated that the causes leading 
to a firm’s decision to divest are very company specific. Factors such as company size, 
access to resources, scope of internationalization, international experience, knowledge of 
the market, and whether the company is listed or not all have to be considered. The 
complemented framework presented in the beginning of this chapter was created based 
on the empirical findings of the cases Lyyti and Groupon. It should be noted that this 
framework is not universally applicable and that the factors leading to foreign divestment 
may vary considerably in other contexts. 
The notion of barriers and incentives to exit was considered as not relevant in the 
context of this thesis. As both case companies had already decided to divest operations 
from a foreign country it could be concluded that the incentives to exit had been stronger 
than the barriers to exit. 
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5.2 Managerial implications 
Along with the theoretical contributions discussed above, this thesis also provides some 
insights that can be useful especially for managers of e-business companies. Four 
managerial recommendations can be drawn from the empirical findings of this thesis: (1) 
the company’s overall performance can be improved by reallocating resources to markets 
with better potential; (2) if a strategy appears to be bad, it should be changed already at 
an early stage; (3) a careful pre-investment analysis can help to avoid foreign divestments 
later on; and (4) a good contact in a foreign country can be the key to success. 
As earlier academic studies have argued, divestment decisions are often based on 
companies’ strategic considerations. The results of this thesis suggest that divestments 
are not always caused by failure of the foreign unit but may be in fact a strategic decision 
of the parent company. Resources should be focused on those markets where the growth 
potential is highest. Divestment can be a financially profitable choice when a company 
can identify markets with better future prospects and decides to reallocate its resources 
there. 
Furthermore, if a strategy appears to be unsuccessful it should be changed at an early 
stage instead of continuing to invest in something that is not working. Managers should 
not take it for granted that if a strategy or a business model has proved to be successful in 
the home country, it will work in a foreign market. The duplication of online business 
models to foreign countries has become widely popular in the e-business industry but 
managers should keep in mind that cultural and environmental differences can cause 
unexpected challenges. 
This leads to the third implication of this thesis. A careful pre-investment analysis is 
important before entering a foreign market. With sufficient preparation the company can 
avoid several mistakes and pitfalls which may lead to foreign divestment. Knowledge 
about local culture, customer preferences, customer behavior, and distribution channels, 
are only a few factors that should be included in the pre-investment analysis. The more 
throughout the analysis is, the better the company is prepared when entering a foreign 
market. 
Finally, the results show that it is important for a company to first find the right 
contacts before starting its international expansion. With the help of a good partner or 
good references in the foreign country it is significantly easier for a new company to 
establish itself and to win new customers. 
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5.3 Suggestions for further research 
Foreign divestments still remain a neglected topic in academic literature compared to 
other areas of international business, such as foreign direct investments. Even though the 
number of studies on foreign divestments has already been rising in recent years, this 
trend should be further continued. Divestments are becoming an increasingly common 
part of multinational companies’ strategy and managers need more information about this 
phenomenon. 
In addition, when writing this thesis, it became evident that there is hardly any official 
data available related to world divestment activity. It would be useful to have more 
information about the scale and frequency of divestments in general, as well as 
divestments in specific countries or industries. For example, there were no public 
statistics available on divestment activity in the e-business sector even though this is a 
very contemporary phenomenon that is affecting companies all over the world. 
This thesis has attempted to examine the factors leading to foreign divestment 
decisions in e-business. Until today there have been no prior studies focusing on 
divestments in this specific sector. Therefore, it could be recommended to conduct further 
research related to foreign divestments within the e-business industry. For example, it 
would be interesting to examine divestments of e-business companies operating in 
unstable environments or developing countries. The results may be somewhat different 
as in this thesis, where environmental factors were found to play only a minor role in the 
divestment decision of the two cases. Both qualitative and quantitative studies are 
required in order to provide a more holistic picture of divestments in this field. As the 
importance of e-business will only grow in the future it can be expected that the 
importance of this topic will grow respectively. 
Due to the nature of a case study, the findings of this thesis are not universally 
applicable information. In order to create generalizations about the phenomenon it would 
be useful to conduct a multiple case study related to factors contributing to foreign 
divestment decisions in e-business. 
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countries from the 
period of 2000 to 2008 
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their international 
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and 2010 
-Host countries’ business 
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impact on foreign firms’ 
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in 67 host countries 
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-Sample of 1560 
foreign subsidiaries of 
101 Korean MNCs in 
31 host countries 
-The companies were 
all publicly listed on the 
Korean stock exchange 
from 1990 to 2008 
-Underperforming, smaller, and 
stand-alone units, especially in 
riskier countries, have a higher risk 
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Song 
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-Large sample of FDIs 
by Korean 
manufacturing MNCs 
from 1990 to 2007 
-Partially-owned subsidiaries are 
more likely to exit the market than 
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-Environmental uncertainty was 
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-Sample of 449 firms 
from 32 countries, all 
of which had business 
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political conditions of their home 
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framework created by 
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Appendix 2: Interview themes 
Environmental stability 
 
• R&D investments in the host country 
• Competitive environment of the host country 
• Country risks in the host country 
• Political environment of the host country 
• Changes in the business environment 
 
Attractiveness of current operations 
 
• Economic goals 
• Economic performance of the foreign unit 
• General economic situation in the host country 




• Diversification of the foreign unit 
• Strategic fit between the headquarters and its foreign affiliate  
• Strategic goals 
• Changes in strategy 
  
Governance issues 
          
• Cultural distance and its effects 
• Entry mode 
• Integration problems 
• Relationship with the foreign partner 
• Earlier international experience 
• Usefulness of experience in international operations 
 
